By Iulia Bârză and Veronica Câmpian
Abstract: This study examines the relationship between the far right and the media in Romania and highlights the associated tensions that influence journalistic work. The Romanian media system, which historically has been characterized by authoritarian control followed by rapid commercialization, is now facing considerable political pressure, fragile editorial independence, and limited economic stability. The article is based on comparative media system research, e.g. the typology of Hallin and Mancini (2004). To illustrate the current situation, two experienced journalists were interviewed. The journalists emphasize that far-right actors undermine press freedom not through open censorship, but rather through delegitimization, manipulation, and disinformation. The interviewees report hostile relationships characterized by intimidation, verbal aggression, and the exclusion of critical media. At the same time, social networks, the main channels for spreading extremist narratives, are weakening traditional journalism. Nevertheless, there are also signs of resilience: journalists are responding with mutual solidarity, thorough fact-checking, and a renewed commitment to fundamental democratic values. The study concludes that, while the far right creates a climate of intimidation, it also triggers collective resistance from journalists. In order to preserve the press as a democratic safeguard, stricter digital regulations, greater transparency, and the promotion of independent media are essential.
Currently, there is a debate in Romania about whether the state should take more decisive action to curb extremism, hate speech, and disinformation. Some of these measures are necessary in order to comply with EU regulations (e.g., EMFA, Digital Services Act), but the heated atmosphere in Romania and the rise of right-wing extremism are also cited when it comes to stricter laws. At the same time, there is a legitimate concern that new laws could be misused to restrict freedom of expression.
While the media under the communist regime were completely controlled by the government and dissenting voices were suppressed (cf. Marincea 2021: 221–222), the fall of communism in 1989 ushered in a profound transformation of the Romanian media system. A dual broadcasting system consisting of public and private media developed. The media transformation process was characterized by rapid privatization, pluralization, and economization (cf. Botan 2024: 3; Surugiu/Ionescu 2018: 191). The result is a hybrid system that is equally influenced by market forces and political influence.
In the field of comparative media system research, Romania is considered the prototype of the polarized-pluralistic model. According to Hallin/Mancini (2004: 98), Romania’s media system is characterized by pronounced political parallelism, a low level of professionalization in journalism, and strong state influence. According to Bălășescu et al. (2024: 15), Romanian private television is the main factor in this classification. It dominates both the viewer and advertising markets and is increasingly pushing public broadcasting into a marginal and financially underfunded position. Driven by the pursuit of profit, private television primarily focuses on entertainment formats and sensationalist news in order to generate high advertising revenues. Ownership structures are often closely intertwined with political and economic elites, favoring political influence and clientelism. This significantly restricts editorial independence, resulting in programming that is often more influenced by the interests of media owners than by the principles of independent and objective journalism.
Dennis McQuail (2006: 51) identifies three fundamental tasks and main functions of journalism, each of which has an empirical and a normative component: »… acting as an observer and informant; providing a channel and forum for other voices outside the media themselves; playing a participatory role in society.« However, Gerli et al. (2018: 22) argue that quality journalism requires certain socio-economic conditions. These include, for example, minimal influence from politics and business, and a high degree of journalistic professionalism. The study concludes that Romania currently does not meet the conditions necessary for the development of broad-based, high-quality journalism.
Romania ranked 55th out of 180 in the 2025 Press Freedom Index, a decline from its previous ranking of 49th (Romania | RSF). According to the NGO Reporters Without Borders (2025), media independence in Romania is particularly threatened by political interference and a lack of transparency in media financing. This is undermining the population’s trust in the independence of the media. Evidence of political influence is seen in the appointment of senior positions at public radio and television stations as well as at the National Audiovisual Council. According to Boshnakova and Dankova (2023: 179f.), political influence is also evident in the threat of withdrawal of advertising by political parties and public institutions, which advertising-financed media depend on. The often opaque allocation of public funds to party-affiliated media leads to market distortions and significantly impairs the media’s control function (Romania | RSF). Adding to this are less obvious attempts to exert influence and exert more or less gentle pressure on editorial offices, which are not without consequences. In this context, Botan (2024: 2f.) mentions restricted access to information, biased reporting, and self-censorship. All of this weakens the role of journalism as a guarantor of the public interest and a guardian of democracy.
According to Bader and Sîrb (2022: 59), in response to the numerous challenges traditional Romanian media are facing, independent journalism, often referred to as »alternative press,« has emerged over the past decade as a counter-reaction to the loss of quality and ethics in the established media. These initiatives, mostly smaller online platforms, emphasize their independence from political and economic interests and are committed exclusively to the public interest.
The development of the alternative press is taking place in a generally difficult news market characterized by changing consumer habits. According to Botan (2024: 8), the Romanian market for news and content on public affairs is relatively limited, as only 59 percent of the population consumes news. This is low compared to the European average of 72 percent. Television continues to dominate news and current event broadcasting, while print media has experienced a significant decline in readership and circulation. A historic low was reached in 2023. At the same time, online platforms, including social media, are increasing in popularity and have become the preferred sources of news, reflecting a broader global trend.
According to Pentina/Tarafdar (2014: 221), the internet has fundamentally changed patterns of information and news consumption. With an ever-growing selection of channels and sources, as well as expanded opportunities for interaction and participation, today’s audiences engage with news differently. This development has profound consequences: traditional print and broadcast media are facing declining advertising revenues, which is affecting the quality of their journalism. At the same time, content on digital communication platforms, whether in blogs, social media, or political forums, is becoming increasingly important. Users not only produce content on these platforms, but also curate it by selecting, disseminating, or hiding specific content. At the same time, the explosive proliferation of often unreliable sources leads to an information overload that can easily contribute to feeling overwhelmed, superficial knowledge acquisition, and the consolidation of one-sided worldviews (cf. Pentina/Tarafdar 2014: 221).
The increased popularity of social networks and changes in media usage behavior point to the profound social change that Romania is currently undergoing. Quite a few people are disappointed and have lost faith in politics (cf. Lovi 2025: 33). This skepticism stems from the perception that the political elite has lost sight of the concerns of ordinary citizens and is only interested in its own advantage. This narrative is spread in particular by far-right parties. They promise far-reaching changes and present themselves as an alternative to the established parties, using their own channels and social media to do so. Lovi (2025) argues that Romania still lacks comprehensive legislation to regulate digital political advertising and misinformation on platforms such as TikTok, Telegram, and Facebook.
How right-wing extremists shape the media: general observations
The rise of radical right-wing parties poses one of the greatest challenges to liberal democracies. Although initially considered a temporary phenomenon, the radical right has established itself as a permanent political force. Contemporary radical right-wing movements differ significantly from their historical predecessors. Plesca and Vasilache (2024: 1f.) emphasize that in Western Europe, the rise of these parties is characterized by nationalism, xenophobia, and Euroscepticism. In several Eastern European countries, including EU members, the rise of right-wing parties is linked to an erosion of democratic standards. This is evident, among other things, in attempts to restrict press freedom, the independence of the judiciary, and the rights of minorities. The rise of these far-right and right-wing populist parties often reflects deep-rooted cultural and historical conflicts that potentially exacerbate social divisions and damage the European Union. According to Mudde (2007: 6), they advocate the liberal democratic system, abide by its rules, and outwardly respect pluralism. This adaptation renders traditional strategies of ostracism and marginalization ineffective. Instead, radical right-wing parties have succeeded in presenting themselves as defenders of »true democracy« and as the authentic voice of ordinary citizens who feel neglected by the political establishment (cf. Eatwell 2003: 226). According to Betz/Johnson (2004: 311), this framing, which allows the radical right to portray itself as a defender of democracy, has proven effective in influencing public debate on controversial issues such as immigration, citizenship, security, law and order, and putting these issues on the political agenda. Behind this democratic façade, however, the radical right continues to engage in aggressive discourse aimed at weakening and undermining the values and institutions of liberal democracy in order to replace them with an alternative, autocratic political order (cf. Pöttker in this issue). It is its dual character that makes the contemporary radical right particularly difficult to define, as it is both democratic and extreme. What is new are public declarations of support for democracy combined with an anti-liberal political doctrine (cf. Pedahzur/Weinberg 2017: 242). This paradox enables the radical right to operate within a democratic framework while simultaneously spreading ideas that must be classified as extremist and anti-democratic (cf. Betz/Johnson 2004: 311).
While right-wing populists are gaining ground in elections, according to Kaiser et al. (2019: 424) they remain largely excluded from the established, democratic media, where journalistic gatekeeping mechanisms restrict the spread of radical ideologies. Supporters of the far right see this as exclusion and proof of the bias of traditional media, which encourages them to turn to other media. Digital communication platforms enable far-right groups to bypass traditional gatekeepers, spread their messages cost-effectively, and use more radical language than would be possible in established media. In addition to news sites and blogs, social media and messenger services have gained relevance. They promote interaction and solidarity between like-minded communities and reinforce far-right discourse (cf. Lovi 2025: 31).
A key reason for the persuasiveness of populist narratives is the targeted use of emotional rather than rational appeals. Populist communication is mostly dramatic, apodictic, exaggerated, and emotionally charged. Fear and anger about actual or perceived grievances are deliberately stirred up and exploited for political purposes, with claims that urgent action is needed. Communication takes place in simplified, direct, and aggressive language reminiscent of tabloid media (cf. Reinemann et al. 2015: 15). The spread of disinformation, conspiracy narratives, and blame deepens the divide between different groups of society (cf. Boboc/Baciu 2025: 28). On an individual level, political statements are often interpreted in a way that confirms existing prejudices and further strengthens loyalty to a party (Zimmermann/Kohring 2020: 217).
Understanding which emotions and attitudes right-wing extremists tap into in their communication, and which populist appeals trigger these emotions (cf. Wirz 2018) is crucial in the fight against right-wing extremism. The increase in the media and communication channels used by populists not only leads to the rapid dissemination of news, but also facilitates rapid mobilization (cf. Bennett/Livingston 2018: 128).
Focus on Romania
After the constitutional crisis of 2024 and the rise of pro-Russian candidate Călin Georgescu, the far-right movement in Romania gained strength, as reflected in a significant proportion of far-right and Euro-sceptic seats in parliament. Bălănescu & Petre (2025) emphasize how this political upheaval profoundly changed the country’s cultural and media structures. Trust in traditional journalism fell to a record low due to opaque financing and political influence, while independent media came under increased attack from far-right actors. The loss of trust shifted public debate to less regulated social media, which in turn fueled the spread of disinformation. Bălănescu and Petre (2025) argue that independent media are important bulwarks against authoritarianism and extremism, but their influence is being weakened by these attacks.
Romania does not have a strong tradition of isolating the radical right. However, it is worth noting the willingness of some democratic parties, such as the liberal-conservative PNL (Partidul Național Liberal = National Liberal Party), to exclude the AUR (Alianța pentru Unirea Românilor = Alliance for the Union of Romanians), founded in 2019, the ultra-nationalist and Eurosceptic S.O.S. Romania, founded in 2021, and the POT (Partidul Oamenilor Tineri = Party of Young People), founded in 2021. The AUR and POT primarily appeal to younger voters; place of residence and income are less decisive than age (Bucci 2025: 13). In addition, Bucci (2025: 13) believes that the AUR’s initially rather vague economic agenda in the last elections was strongly influenced by the libertarian messages of Donald Trump and Elon Musk. S.O.S. Romania is accused of having close ties to Russia. The voices of these political actors have become louder in the Romanian parliament and are damaging Romania’s reputation on the European stage (Plesca/Vasilache 2024: 90).
In this very tense political context, working conditions for journalists are difficult and their safety is at risk. They are faced with smear campaigns, and Civicus Monitor (2022) reported that the AUR had published a list of »harmful and dishonest media« on its Facebook page. This list included television stations and publications such as Digi 24, Antena 3, Realitatea TV, and Newsweek, as well as prominent journalists such as Cristian Tudor Popescu and Lucian Mîndruță. Politically motivated harassment and attacks against journalists are on the rise, especially against those who report critically on right-wing politicians or nationalist groups. Independent and opposition voices are to be discredited and silenced.
Attacks on journalists also originate from supporters of far-right political groups. Civicus Monitor (2025) reports cases in which right-wing demonstrators have attacked or harassed journalists: During a demonstration in Bucharest in early January 2024 against the Constitutional Court’s decision to invalidate the 2024 presidential elections, demonstrators vandalized a car belonging to the news channel Antena3-CNN Observator. They tried to puncture the tires and tear off the license plates. Several journalists were verbally and physically threatened during the same demonstration. Protesters threw pretzels and water bottles at Digi24 reporter Ioana Corneev and a cameraman while they were reporting live on the scene.
On January 24, 2025, journalists and cameramen from Digi24 and Prima TV were again harassed by right-wing extremist pro-Georgescu demonstrators. During a live broadcast, the demonstrators called journalist Valentin Stan a »liar« and prevented the cameraman from continuing to film. A team from Prima TV suffered a similar fate.
Similar scenes unfolded on March 9, 2025. A Digi24 minibus was overturned and severely damaged by pro-Georgescu demonstrators. Violent clashes broke out between the police and Georgescu supporters. On March 10, the public prosecutor’s office announced that it had initiated criminal proceedings against four people for disturbing public order.
It is not only supporters of far-right parties who attack journalists; far-right politicians themselves also take action against media representatives. On March 19, 2025, an incident occurred in the parliament building. Journalists wanted to get a statement from Anamaria Gavrilă, the chair of the POT, after she had stopped answering questions for several days, fuelling speculations about her possible withdrawal from the presidential election campaign. According to the official statement, the MP called the police and referred to »verbal differences« with the media. However, law enforcement officers determined that the journalists were performing their work legally and issued a warning to the POT chairwoman. During the confrontation, Gavrilă filmed the media representatives and shouted angrily, »This is the press!« She portrayed herself as a victim of aggressive journalists on Facebook. When the POT chairwoman was approached again by journalists in the corridors of parliament on May 6, 2025, she threatened: »You are a dying breed. I can’t wait to see you disappear.«
Journalists are also facing more political pressure in their daily work. Journalist Monica Vasilescu of Realitatea Plus announced her resignation in a Facebook post, citing political pressure as the reason. Vasilescu explained that she had been instructed to refer to Georgescu as »the elected president« in news reports immediately after January 1, 2025, which did not correspond to the political reality. The Realitatea Plus broadcaster contradicted Monica Vasilescu’s statements, claiming they only learned of the journalist’s decision to resign through her Facebook post. No one had ever forced her to act against her convictions.
To find out how the rise of right-wing extremism in Romania is affecting journalistic practice, we spoke to two experienced journalists: E. C., a journalist at the news portal Digi24.ro, and L. B., a journalist and TV presenter at Prima TV. In their journalistic work, they encounter both politicians from democratic parties and representatives of the far right.
The interviews cover three topics: first, threats to press freedom; second, the relationship between far-right politicians and journalists; and third, the impact on the public. This gave us valuable insights into everyday journalistic life and taught us more about the challenges journalists face in their daily work – from political and economic pressure to verbal attacks and attempts to prevent independent reporting and exclude unpopular journalists.
Both journalists believe that the reputation and credibility of the press are at risk. Citizens’ trust in the media is dwindling, and extremist political actors want to eliminate independent, critical journalism. Although this is not explicit censorship, both journalists report attempts to undermine the credibility and truthfulness of the press. Examples include public attacks on media companies and organizations whose journalists ask critical questions, as well as targeted smear campaigns and the spread of conspiracy theories. E. C. illustrates this with a situation she experienced personally: Diana Șoșoacă, the chairwoman of the S.O.S. party, said on Digi24, when the journalist corrected a false claim made by the politician: »Digi24 – those who killed people and forced them to get vaccinated.«
Politicians on the far right often resort to misinformation to discredit the press that is critical of them, both on the spot during interviews and on social media. This lying and twisting of facts impacts the general information climate and constantly puts professional journalism into question, ultimately undermining public trust in the media. This appears to be a calculated move. By discrediting democratic media, far-right actors are driving public and political communication to social media, where they can exercise complete control over the information that is disseminated. In addition, social media algorithms can create echo chambers, radicalizing supporters of far-right parties, as they are no longer confronted with opposing views.
Both interviewees sense the hostile attitude toward journalists. The right-wing extremists see themselves as opponents of the »system« and the »corrupt elite ruling the country« (cf. Mudde 2007: 5). They present themselves to their supporters and potential voters as the true representatives of the people. Both L. B. and E. C. mention aggressive behavior, verbal attacks, and attempts at intimidation by right-wing extremist politicians. They refuse to answer critical questions and threaten journalists. When journalists try to refute lies – such as the claim that Ukrainian children receive higher subsidies from the Romanian state than Romanian children – far-right MP Diana Șoșoacă does not shy away from asking whether E. C. is »the mistress of Marcel Ciolacu« (former prime minister) in order to discredit her as biased.
A particularly obvious attack on press freedom is the restriction of certain media outlets’ access to events or places of public interest. On the evening of the 2025 presidential elections – the most important political event of the year – George Simion banned journalists from Antena 1, Antena 3 CNN, and G4Media from entering the campaign headquarters. On the other hand, the far right has very good relations with other media outlets, e.g. the broadcaster Realitatea TV, which the National Council for Audiovisual Media has fined several times for spreading false information, including a fine of 200,000 lei on February 26, 2025, and one of 100,000 lei on March 4, 2025, for misinformation. The targeted selection of media partners turns the relationship with the press into a tactical instrument: critical journalists are excluded and attacked, while the obedient press becomes a mouthpiece. The journalists’ responses suggest a relationship characterized by rejection, control, and instrumentalization. Journalism can no longer fully perform its mediating role between politics and citizens.
When asked whether the rhetoric and attitude of right-wing extremist politicians in any way affects journalists’ courage to ask critical questions and report freely, L. B. replies that the behavior of these politicians actually promotes solidarity among journalists: They have formed a coalition of the press against manipulation, or rather a professional community that shares common values. L. B. emphasizes that the aggressiveness and hostility of right-wing extremist politicians has not led to journalists withdrawing from the public sphere.
With regard to the influence on public opinion, L. B. and E. C. agree that extremist discourse inevitably reaches the public. Social networks play a decisive role in this, as they enable messages to spread quickly and allow attempts at manipulation. E. C. recalls the #echilibrusiverticalitate (#balanceandverticality) campaign, which used bots and managed to get Călin Georgescu to number 9 on the list of political candidates with the most followers on TikTok. This facilitates the creation of a loyal electorate that rejects counterarguments, idolizes far-right politicians, and adopts their statements without verifying, thereby promoting the spread of false information and accusations in these echo chambers (cf. Boboc/Baciu 2025: 28).
At the same time, the journalists agree that responsible media play an essential balancing role by verifying facts, exposing misinformation, and providing explanations that enable citizens to distinguish between truth and manipulation. Despite these efforts, the interviewees’ responses show that the influence of social media is so severe that traditional journalism is constantly struggling to regain lost ground. Both journalists are concerned about the rapid spread of extremist messages via social media and the population’s susceptibility to these messages. E. C. claims that online media has become the most important source of information for at least some voters, and L. B. fears that journalists and reputable media outlets will be unable to prevent the spread of messages from right-wing extremist politicians. In addition, both are certain that online media have fundamentally changed the way in which far-right narratives are disseminated and internalized by citizens.
Analysis of the interviews with journalists L. B. and E. C. shows that the relationship between the far-right and the Romania media is characterized by structural tension that extends beyond individual incidents. Both agree that press freedom is not openly restricted, but rather undermined by subtle mechanisms such as manipulation, disinformation, and the discrediting of journalists. The relationship between the far right and the media is hostile: critical publications are excluded and attacked, while media outlets that are subservient to the far right have become propaganda channels. When it comes to influencing the public, both journalists emphasize the central role of social networks in spreading extremist messages and creating echo chambers. However, the interviewees’ responses also show resistance: both journalists are not abandoning their critical stance, but are even recognizing a tendency toward professional solidarity in the face of attacks. The general conclusion is that the far right has succeeded in putting pressure on the media and intimidating them. At the same time, this situation has triggered collective resistance from journalists who are trying to consolidate journalism’s function as a guardian of democracy by fact-checking and exposing manipulation.
Conclusion
These findings raise the question under which conditions journalism in Romania can continue to fulfill its democratic functions in the future. The importance of independent journalism remains crucial. Especially at a time when automated information systems and disinformation campains threaten democratic communication, access to credible news is of central importance (cf. Gross/Schultz 2025).
Given the current political developments in Romania, growing mistrust of the media, and the omnipresence of far-right narratives, the future of journalism in Romania depends on the ability of media companies and democratic institutions to create robust mechanisms to protect against manipulation and disinformation.
There is a need for clearer regulation of digital communication platforms, particularly with regard to political advertising and combating disinformation on social networks, which have become the most important mobilization tool for the far right. At the same time, strengthening quality journalism requires investment in the professionalization of editorial offices, greater transparency in media financing, and less dependence on political or economic resources. Another essential element is promoting media literacy among citizens to make them more resilient to polarizing narratives. According to Gross/Schultz (2025), prebunking, as a preventive method against misinformation, offers a promising approach to promoting citizens’ media literacy. If these approaches are pursued consistently, the media can fulfill their public role and effectively counteract the radicalization strategies of the far right.
About the authors
Iulia Bârză (*2002) earned her bachelor’s degree in communication and public relations from the College of Political, Administrative, and Communication Sciences at Babeş-Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca, Romania, in 2024. She is currently pursuing a master’s degree in advertising and public relations. Contact: iuliabarza@gmail.com / iulia.barza@stud.ubbcluj.ro
Dr. Veronica Câmpian (*1981) is a lecturer in the Department of Communication, Public Relations, and Advertising at the College of Political, Administrative, and Communication Sciences at Babeş-Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca, Romania. She researches and teaches on topics such as media theories, media language, and political communication. Contact: veronica.campian@fspac.ro
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Citation
Iulia Bârză; Veronica Câmpian: Media freedom in the shadow of right-wing extremism. Challenges for Romanian journalists. In: Journalism Research, Vol. 8 (3-4), 2025, pp. 338-351. DOI: 10.1453/2569-152X-3-42025-15601-en
ISSN
2569-152X
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1453/2569-152X-3-42025-15601-en
First published online
December 2025