By Horst Pöttker
Abstract: The freedom of the press is regarded as a necessary but insufficient framework for social communication and democratic problem-solving. It is the task of journalists to fill this framework with appropriate content. Right-wing extremism is understood as the disregard of constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights, favoring instead ethnic unity and nationalist aggression. Journalists cannot effectively counter the threatening rise of right-wing extremism by ignoring it or expressing outrage. And treating the AfD like any other party leads to a problematic normalization of right-wing extremist statements and intentions. In contrast, a strategy of objective, fearless, concrete, and, at the same time, sober reporting on intentions and plans that violate fundamental rights, as well as their foreseeable consequences in the event that organizations such as the AfD come to power, can contribute to curbing right-wing extremism. In order to implement such a strategy, the repression of the Nazi past, populist tendencies in journalism, and the journalistic focus on political institutions must be overcome.
The aim is to clarify which journalistic options are available for reporting on right-wing extremist statements and organizations such as the Alternative for Germany (AfD) in a way that can help curb right-wing extremism without disregarding press freedom and professional principles.
Terms
The freedom of the press was established relatively late in Germany (cf. Pöttker 2016). Since 1949, Article 5 of the Grundgesetz (GG) [Basic Law] has stated: »Freedom of the press and freedom of reporting by means of broadcasts and films shall be guaranteed. There shall be no censorship.» This refers not only to the production and dissemination of information, but also to its reception: »Every person shall have the right …to inform themselves without hindrance from generally accessible sources.« The following paragraph makes it clear that this is not an unconditional freedom: »These rights shall find their limits in the provisions of general laws, in provisions for the protection of young persons and in the right to personal honor.«
Freedom of expression, guaranteed by the Basic Law, is one of the irrevocable individual rights. The freedom of the press also has an indispensable social value, especially for democracies. Its importance for good governance and social cohesion was already recognized in Germany, which lagged behind Western democracies (cf. Plessner 1959), during the restorative era of censorship measures prescribed by the Carlsbad Decrees [Karlsbader Beschlüsse]. In 1830, constitutional lawyer Carl Theodor Welcker wrote in a petition to the German Federal Assembly:
»The government[ …] can do nothing more effective than to maintain knowledge of all the empirical circumstances and needs of the entire people, especially its trade and commerce, and to continuously acquire the wisest ideas and the best advice from all members of the nation in order to correctly assess and deal with these circumstances. […] Freedom of the press simultaneously mediates and organically unites the nation and the government and their forces for the common purpose.[ …] Freedom of the press establishes[ …] for both the best safeguard against disruption of the union through their own aberrations.« (Welcker 1981: 76f.)[1]
After 1949, the Federal Constitutional Court issued several landmark rulings strengthening the freedom of the press on the basis of its social significance, for example in the Spiegel ruling of 1966:
»The press [ …] critically summarizes the opinions and demands that are constantly being formed in society and its groups, presents them for discussion, and brings them to the attention of the political authorities [ …]; in doing so, the possible beneficial consequences of publication must also be taken into account. For example, exposing significant weaknesses in defense readiness may, despite the initial military disadvantages associated with it, be more important for the welfare of the Federal Republic in the long term than secrecy.« (BVerfG, Spiegel ruling, August 5, 1966, cited in Pöttker 2012: 44)
For all fundamental rights, the formal framework of the Basic Law is not sufficient for democracy.
»What is written in the constitution is one thing; another thing is the question of whether and how the values formulated in it are actually implemented. But that is what matters.« (Lammert 2007: 6)
The well-known dictum of constitutional lawyer Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, that the liberal state depends on conditions that it cannot itself ensure through laws and authoritative commands (cf. Böckenförde 1976: 60), expresses a central problem of democracies. In the case of press freedom, however, this does not appear to be an unsolvable dilemma. After all, there is the profession of journalism, which exists specifically to bring the goals of transparency and social integration down from the heavens of idealism to the earth of their implementation. In capitalist democracies such as the Federal Republic of Germany (cf. GG Art. 20), markets and elections are the most important regulatory mechanisms. They can only function if as many citizens as possible know what is for sale or up for election. The journalistic profession therefore has the task of disseminating accurate and important information as widely as possible. Its basic norm is to publish, to make public what is happening in the world. This basic norm is limited only by doubts as to whether messages are accurate, important to the audience, and can be understood by them.
In order to fulfill their basic standard, journalists must assume that their audience is mature, i.e., capable of dealing with information intelligently and processing it in their own interest, ideally through discourse with one another.[2] The task of the journalism profession is not to influence the audience, but to make the world transparent as it is.[3] People in modern societies must be able to rely on there being at least one profession that consistently pursues this goal.
In order to ensure the accuracy and comprehensibility of its information, the journalistic profession has developed techniques for researching and presenting information (journalistic »craft«); however, importance cannot be achieved in this way, because it is not inherent in the events and processes that need to be reported or not reported, but is subjectively attributed.[4] With regard to the reception aspect of press freedom, media diversity and also personnel diversity, and thus diversity of relevance, criteria are therefore required.
Democracy thrives not least on conflicts over positions of power and authority (cf. Pöttker 1980: 180-261). The institutionalization of elections – and thus election campaigns – , but also the right to go on strike, demonstrate, and petition, reveal this conflictual core of democracy on a formal level.
In order for conflicts of interest to be resolved and problems to be regulated, it is part of the democratic quality of journalism to make internal social conflicts, e.g., between social classes, visible in reporting. In contrast, the nationalistic and ethnocentric emphasis on external conflicts in a society imagined as homogeneous (»Volksgemeinschaft«) expresses an anti-democratic tendency, because problem-regulating debates are hindered by the concealment of genuine conflicts of interest (cf. Pöttker 1980: 338-589). If too few such debates take place, increased social pressure can lead to the collapse of the democratic system.
What does extremism mean from a democratic perspective? Given the irrevocability that both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the German Constitution attribute to fundamental rights, considering their legitimate restrictions, it stands to reason that ideologies that seek to justify disregarding the fundamental rights enshrined in the concept of human dignity for the sake of supposedly higher (state) goals should be labeled extremist. Whether it is left-wing or right-wing extremism is measured by the fundamental rights that are called into question by the respective ideology. In the case of left-wing extremism, this primarily concerns property and inheritance rights, unless the legitimate restrictions laid down in Articles 14 and 15 of the German Basic Law (expropriation or socialization for the common good, compensation, legal regulation) are observed.
In the case of right-wing extremism, it is primarily equality, the right to asylum, freedom of religion, the right to citizenship, and protection from extradition that are still considered vulnerable even when the legitimate restrictions granted in Articles 16 and 16a of the German Basic Law (in the case of extraditions, requirements of an international court of justice, security of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the destination country) are not met. According to right-wing extremist ideologies, these fundamental rights can be disregarded for the sake of national homogeneity. They are characterized by an ethnocentric, nationalistic, or racist overemphasis on external conflicts with other nations, states, or cultures. This is anti-democratic insofar as it ignores the values of minority protection and the legitimacy of conflicts of power that are constitutive of democracies.
Starting point
According to many observers, right-wing extremism currently poses the greatest threat to democracy.[5] The Alternative for Germany (AfD) party, which the German domestic intelligence service has classified as right-wing extremist until further notice,[6] received over 20 percent of the vote for the first time in the 2025 federal election and became the strongest party in the East German states.[7] The AfD’s right-wing extremism is characterized by its use of nationalist rhetoric to curtail the rights of ethnic and sexual minorities and the right to asylum, and even to forcibly return migrants with German citizenship (»remigration«).[8] A characteristic feature of the extreme right-wing threat to democracy posed by this party, but also by other, largely banned organizations, is not least the trivialization of the crimes against humanity committed by the Nazi regime (which the honorary chairman of the AfD Alexander Gauland referred to as a »just speck of bird shit« in German history) to outright denial, often accompanied by the illegal use of Nazi symbols and slogans.[9]
What poses a particular threat to democracy is that right-wing extremist organizations and individuals not only pursue a political strategy, but above all wage culture wars not only against gender-neutral language, but above all against the existing diversity of religion, gender, sexuality, etc., and thus against fundamental rights. Their aim is to influence the thinking and behavior of young people in particular, whose attitudes are not yet firmly established, in line with a populistic anti-democratic ideology. This is apparently successful, as there is a disproportionately high number of AfD voters among young men in particular (cf. ZDF/dpa 2024). This is also due to the fact that right-wing extremist campaigns use the digital means of communication preferred by young people. A typical feature of this is the invocation of freedom of opinion and expression, whereby its limits are ignored.[10]
Hesitation on the part of state authorities in defending fundamental rights against rising right-wing extremism is inappropriate, even if the AfD’s share of the vote in the West German states is (still) lower than in eastern Germany or that of corresponding parties in Austria, France, and other European countries.[11] The tough debate over banning the AfD shows how problematic indecision is here. The Constitutional Court didn’t ban the NPD in 2017 because it was politically too insignificant (see BVerfG 2017). A ban on the AfD is currently rejected on the grounds that banning the largest opposition party in the Bundestag would be seen as unfairly eliminating a political rival and would drive even more voters into the arms of the AfD.[12] The political debate, which is cited as a better alternative to a ban, has not slowed the AfD’s growth in votes so far, especially since the debate with this party to win over its voters is largely conducted with similarly anti-minority rhetoric.
Right-wing extremism wraps a soft shell of ostensibly bourgeois decency and democratic normality around its hard core of ethnocentric and racist disregard for fundamental rights.[13] When leading AfD politicians are interviewed on public radio or television, they are careful not to explicitly question the Basic Law, especially on high-profile programs such as Deutschlandfunk’s Interview der Woche [the interview of the week] or Caren Miosga, a weekly talk show on ARD.[14] Even in its official manifesto, the AfD presents itself as harmless and hardly reveals its misanthropic grimace. The preamble, for example, reads:
»We are committed democrats. […] We could no longer stand by and watch the breakdown of law and order and the destruction of the constitutional state […]. […] As free citizens, we stand for direct democracy, the separation of powers, and the rule of law […].« (AfD 2016: 6)[15]
This strategy includes backtracking after overly provocative anti-constitutional statements, revealing a deliberate strategy toward reputable media outlets and their audiences.[16] In 2025, the AfD even adopted a new code of conduct in order to appear more moderate in the Bundestag (cf. Ganswindt 2025).
Through its Janus-faced nature, the AfD contributes to inconsistency in the journalistic treatment of right-wing extremism, which expresses uncertainty rather than diversity:
»The spectrum of opinion on this issue is extremely broad, ranging from ›treat them like any other party‹ to ›completely exclude them from reporting so as not to give them a platform‹. Prominent voices can be found for each of these positions.« (Blümel 2025: 14)
There is only a certain degree of consistency in two editorial practices. Where possible, home stories featuring AfD politicians are avoided so as not to obscure their political intentions from the audience by creating personal sympathy.[17]
The other point of agreement concerns the verification of factual claims made by politicians. Since Donald Trump started flooding international politics with misinformation, fact-checking during and after interviews has become a professional standard in journalism.[18] When asked about their approach to the AfD, local editorial offices mention the usual verification of factual statements made by politicians, which is carried out particularly thoroughly in this case (cf. Blümel 2025: 16f.).
The tips for editorial offices provided by the German Journalists’ Association NRW state:
»Journalistic tools such as thorough research, questioning, and classifying statements remain central.« (»5 Tipps« 2025: 20)
Accuracy can be subject to rules of craftsmanship, but this does not apply to importance, i.e., the selection of what is communicated and what is not. The main problem with right-wing extremism is not that it distorts facts and disregards the requirement of empirical accuracy. The central problem with the AfD, which is currently growing at an alarming rate, is that as a political party it disregards the normative foundations spelled out in the first 19 articles of the Basic Law and summarized in the concept of human dignity.
Criticism
Democracy effectively cannot be defended through speeches in the Bundestag [German Parliament] alone. This is also due to the culture war waged by the AfD and other right-wing extremist organizations. But even if democratic parties would make use of digital platforms in the same way as right-wing extremists, it would not suffice. In addition to political statements and legal measures, attention must also be paid to journalism, its media, and their handling of right-wing extremism. Is journalism fulfilling its task of using press freedom in such a way that the problem of growing right-wing extremism can be regulated and the AfD’s increase in votes can be curbed without disregarding basic journalistic standards?
There is also uncertainty about how to deal with right-wing extremism even within the same medium. Public broadcasting is committed to internal plurality of the political opinions represented in it. But when dealing with anti-constitutional right-wing extremism, is a desirable plurality of positions and journalistic working methods even an issue?
On June 14, 2025, the national public radio station Deutschlandfunk aired a controversial discussion between two of its leading journalists, Friedbert Meurer, head of the news department, and Christiane Florin, head of the culture department, on the program Streitkultur [Culture of debate]. Florin advocated a strategy of refraining from interviewing AfD representatives because this would require a common basis for communication that does not exist; a position that ultimately amounts to reporting little or nothing about the AfD, because interviews are also indispensable research tools. It is obvious that this consequence is incompatible with the basic journalistic mission of making the world as it is, and to which right-wing extremism in the form of the AfD undoubtedly belongs, comprehensively transparent. In contrast Meurer argued
»Deutschlandfunk must represent the entire spectrum of opinions as far as possible […] . Interviews are difficult, but they are part of the job.« (Blümel 2025: 20)
This boils down to treating the AfD like other parties, a position that communications scientist Marcus Maurer has also advocated, calling on journalists
»simply to remember their craft when reporting on the AfD: to report in a fact-based and objective (not moralizing) manner, as should also be a matter of course in the case of other parties.« (Maurer 2019: 137f.)
The reference to the craft of journalism, which is often heard in such contexts, is problematic because, unlike many skilled trades, journalism is subject to a greater need for change. It must adapt immediately to upheavals in the political, social, and technological conditions that it is reporting on and which also constitute the conditions of its production. This requires the willingness and ability to make profound changes to its own self-image and work methods (cf. Pöttker 2024).
The strategy of treating the right-wing extremism embodied by the AfD as normal is particularly problematic because it relativizes its hostility toward fundamental rights and the German Basic Law. The fact that Maurer rejects both the strategy of reporting little or nothing about the AfD and the spontaneous response of expressing outrage about it is evidence of realistic skepticism regarding the prospects of success.[19] Ignoring and moralizing lead the public to perceive the victim role that right-wing extremists claim for themselves with their propaganda as authentic, as long as they are not yet in power everywhere. But when Maurer argues that treating the AfD like other parties in normal journalistic practice does not necessarily mean »critically ignoring right-wing extremist tendencies in parts of the party,« but that »reporting should […] not be limited to these aspects,« (Maurer 2019: 138), this amounts to an appeasing cover-up of what fundamentally threatens democracy through right-wing extremists.
Both, ignoring and normalizing, demonstrate a reluctance deeply incompatible with journalistic professionalism – namely to face the right-wing extremist threat to democracy with open eyes. This reluctance is often justified by the argument that one does not want to offer the AfD a »platform«; or one focuses on its soft bourgeois shell, with which the party surrounds itself in official political life for purposes of legitimization, while overlooking its hard core of anti-constitutionalism and inhumanity.[20]
The fact that neither journalistic suppression nor outrage nor normalization leads to success cannot sufficiently be justified by the increasing number of voters and elected representatives of the AfD (see Mediendienst Integration 2025). In addition to misguided journalistic strategies, other reasons can be found in politics itself. Above all, the social discourse on migration has gone astray, for which journalism is partly responsible.[21] However, this does not change the inappropriateness of the journalistic strategies mentioned above. Maurer’s critical analysis is convincing when it comes to ignoring and expressing outrage. But there are also skeptical voices from the social sciences regarding his recommended approach to the AfD in the form of everyday »craftsmanship.« Journalist Corinna Blümel reports in the magazine of the German Journalists’ Association NRW on what political scientist Cord Schmelze has to say about this practice:
»The portrayal in media that are perceived as reputable makes these [right-wing extremist] positions part of the legitimate spectrum of opinion and lends them legitimacy because the credibility of the media is transferred to them.« (Blümel 2025: 14)
One slippery slope that leads to this trap is the traditional focus of political reporting on the legislative, executive, and judicial institutions, vis-à-vis and within which right-wing extremist organizations like to show their harmless side (cf. Wagner 2025). Against the backdrop of this tradition, it may seem obsolete to report on AfD statements at the lower political levels. However, in order to reveal the anti-democratic core of the AfD, it can be particularly revealing to directly report »that [and especially how] an AfD politician insulted the Federal Government’s Integration Commissioner in an East German village hall« (Maurer 2019: 138). Quoting the hollow commitment to democracy from the official AfD program on one hand, or giving Tino Chrupalla, who is considered the »good cop« at the party leadership and is committed to moderation, the opportunity to make reassuring statements in an interview, on the other hand, has the effect of trivializing the issue.
Nevertheless, not every right-wing extremist provocation that strategically targets the media-constructed public sphere should be met with immediate outrage, as demanded by news journalism fixated on spectacular events and maximum speed. Beyond moralizing, ignoring, and normalizing, is there another way of reporting on right-wing extremism that can hopefully contribute more to its containment?
Recommendations
One such strategy could be to expose the true nature of right-wing extremism, which threatens the self-determination and lives of each and every individual, through factual, sober, unbiased, and fearless reporting. It cannot be ruled out that insights into the brutal activities and intentions of right-wing extremist organizations might also lead to a grounding in human rights and a stronger commitment to defending the Basic Law.[22]
Criticism of the ineffective, even reinforcing outrage over right-wing extremism concerns the broad field of expression of opinion in the media.[23] However, the task of making the world as it is transparent mainly involves the widest possible dissemination of accurate and important facts. This also applies to the professional handling of right-wing extremism and the AfD.
When it comes to the quality of relevance, which is not subject to binding rules, the question is which subjective selection preferences are more or less justifiable. With regard to right-wing extremism, it seems to me most justifiable to prioritize information that shows its anti-constitutional nature. Instead of ignoring right-wing extremism, being outraged by it, or downplaying it by focusing on its veneer of legitimacy, it is possible under the condition of press freedom and important for self-determination to concentrate the selection of information on facts that reveal the anti-constitutional core of right-wing extremism.
This may also include placing news items, e.g., about statements made by the AfD, in an objective context that highlights the core substance of right-wing extremism, which disregards fundamental rights. In some circumstances, this may also be possible in interviews, with the interviewer persistently pointing out facts that reveal the anti-human rights aspirations of right-wing extremism.
It may therefore be more promising to comment less on the classification of the AfD as a confirmed right-wing extremist party by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution and more on the specific circumstances that led to this classification. These include not only the AfD’s anti-constitutional demands, but also the consequences for the existence of the democratic, order guaranteeing fundamental rights and for every individual within it if this party were to come to power and realize its intentions.
In societies whose highly complex structures block insight into the consequences of actions, the task of journalism is not only to examine current circumstances. It also requires publicizing the foreseeable effects of the actions of many people, and thus of each and every individual, in order to make them aware of the consequences of their actions and inactions and to promote a sense of responsibility for them (cf. Pöttker 1996; 1997: 303–315).
The obligation to make the foreseeable consequences of actions transparent correlates with the certainty with which these consequences will occur. Today, no one would dispute that it is part of the journalist’s duty to point out, for example, the connection between CO2 emissions caused in part by consumer habits and the threat global warming poses to humanity;[24] the same applies to consumer behavior as to voting behavior: the more votes the AfD receives, the more certain it is to assume that we can no longer rely on the fundamental rights guaranteed by our Basic Law.
Historical journalistic reviews can also help in this regard (cf. Pöttker 2011). 1933 does not have to repeat itself, nor does Auschwitz have to happen again. But we Germans in particular not only have every reason, but also a good opportunity and strong incentive to remember what it means when the consequences of growing right-wing extremism are misjudged.
Specifically, for example, reporting on migration policy could focus less on the contradictions between European Union law and border controls and more on the consequences in the everyday lives of those affected if an AfD-dominated executive were to realize its project of »remigrating« people with a migration history.[25] Plus: in an immigration society without migrants, could we (still) expect to receive adequate treatment in the event of an accident or illness, to have our roofs or computers repaired, to dispose of waste, or to acquire up-to-date knowledge while studying?
Apart from the explicit threat to fundamental rights such as personal freedom, equality, freedom of religion, freedom of movement, citizenship, or asylum, the tone of right-wing extremist statements also reveals a lack of respect for others and thus a disregard for human dignity as the supreme fundamental right, which in Article 5 of the German Basic Law corresponds to the »right to personal honor« as a barrier to freedom of the press.
Quality media outlets must not be content to reproduce standard news agency reports on the activities of the AfD and leave further research to poorly paid and risk-taking freelancers at best. They should – ideally in competitive alliances such as Netzwerk Recherche (Netzwerk Recherche 2025) – conduct thorough research into the AfD’s anti-constitutional activities and their foreseeable effects.
One example of this is the research conducted by the investigative portal Correctiv on the secret Potsdam conference, at which protagonists not only from the AfD recommended the mass repatriation of German citizens with a migrant background – »remigration« in the sense of deportation (cf. Müller 2024). Another example of factual, sober reporting on anti-democratic extremism and its foreseeable consequences is the unbiased essay by U.S. journalist Ava Kofman on the right-wing intellectual Curtis Yarvin, who pulls the ideological strings behind the Trumpism of J.D. Vance, Peter Thiel, etc. (cf. Kofman 2025).
When reporting on demands that violate fundamental rights and describing the consequences that their implementation would have, a didactic tone should be avoided, even if this is difficult. Even here, professionalism requires that spontaneous feelings be put aside. There is a justified fear that indignant distancing on the part of the audience could easily give rise to the impression, inflated by AfD propaganda, that its politicians are being made victims who are persecuted for the sake of their cause (giving them a martyr status) (cf. Rokahr 2025). Lecturing often leads to the opposite of what it is intended to be achieved, especially when it comes to young people. Right-wing extremist propaganda can take advantage of this by ridiculing those who lecture.
Avoiding populist educational intentions is also advisable because the style of dealing with right-wing extremism can reinforce the impression of collusion between politics and journalism. A factual, sober tone is also appropriate to emphasize journalistic independence from the ruling political establishment and its constant appeals.
With such a professional strategy, journalism can influence election results despite the presence of right-wing populists and extremists in digital networks. This was demonstrated, for example, in the repeat presidential election in Romania in 2025 (cf. Gross/Schultz 2025).
Problems
As promising as a strategy of fearless objectivity may be, it is difficult to implement. This is primarily because a thorough presentation of what right-wing extremism actually means requires more in-depth research than giving in to repression, outrage, or normalization. But the resources for research have become scarcer as a result of the economic crisis into which digitization has plunged the journalistic profession.[26] To make matters worse, the inappropriate ways of dealing with right-wing extremism can also be explained by historically grown socio-cultural circumstances that cannot be eliminated.
It is revealing that journalism research in Germany has long observed a tendency, particularly in the regional press, to report on Nazi-affiliated activities, if at all, only when packaged in a reassuring portrayal of critical counter-activities (cf. Penzhorn 2009; Reichel/Wicking 2010). This has been observed in newspapers in both, the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the old Federal Republic of Germany. The reluctance to report unvarnished what neo-Nazis say about their brutal intentions and plans reflects not only the fear of right-wing extremist reactions, to which local journalism in particular is exposed (cf. Krell et al. in this issue), but also a tendency to repress everything related to the crimes against humanity committed by the Nazi regime. As understandable as the rejection of this literally unbelievable past may be (cf. Pöttker 2005: esp. 7–10), professional journalism that takes its task of making the world transparent seriously, including its terrible realities, must overcome the unconscious refusal to acknowledge Auschwitz, Buchenwald, or Oradour. Swimming against the tide of repression through professional self-education is one of the difficulties that make it hard to deal with right-wing extremism in an unbiased way.
An unconsciously unbroken tradition of both German dictatorships, fascist and socialist, is expressed in the journalistic tendency to express outrage at right-wing extremism. Being outraged contains an element of condemnation that is intended to influence others. In both dictatorships, journalists were regarded as educators of the nation (cf. Pöttker 2008a); the 1933 Editors Act[27] and Lenin’s view of the functions of socialist journalism, as taught in the GDR[28], assigned them this task of educating the people. Admittedly, journalism in West Germany after 1945, with the help of the Allies, and in East Germany after 1990, under pressure from Western politicians and corporations (cf. Klammer 1998; Tröger 2019), adopted, at least on the surface, the Anglo-Saxon model of reporting free from political influence. But cultural continuities are more enduring than institutional upheavals. For example, the separation of news and commentary in German media is not organizationally anchored by separating the respective editorial offices, as is the case with the New York Times (cf. The Newsroom 2025[29]). The same can be assumed for the traditional self-image of educating the people, which is fading but has yet to completely disappear.[30]
In order to avoid the counterproductive effects of journalistic outrage about the AfD, it would be useful for journalists to become aware of this tradition and break away from it. Given the persistence of mental habits, this also appears to be a problem that can only be overcome in the very long term.
Normalization and trivialization of right-wing extremism are linked to the traditional focus of political reporting on state institutions and interest groups anterior to the state (parties, associations, unions, churches, etc.).[31] Because right-wing extremist organizations like to present their seemingly democratic side at this institutional level, this view overlooks their anti-constitutional substance.
This problem will also be difficult to overcome, especially since the public relations work of institutions, including that of the AfD, saves journalism the trouble of time-consuming research in view of dwindling resources.[32] The critical objection that this is also due to the adaptation of public relations work to the expectations of journalism cannot be dismissed; however, this »intereffication« [Intereffikation, the mutual influencing of journalism and public relations] (cf. Bentele/Nothaft 2004; Schweiger 2013) also means that the bubble in which journalism and politics operate perpetuates itself.[33]
If the strategy of dealing with right-wing extremism in a manner that is as fearless as it is factual and sober is to succeed, these reasons for the ineffective and even counterproductive journalistic treatment of right-wing extremism and the AfD must be recognized and analyzed.
Another, almost insurmountable problem arises from the central structural feature of highly complex societies, which jeopardizes their self-regulation even when democratic self-determination, market control, and freedom of the press are institutionally protected. A high degree of complexity means a high degree of social fragmentation, and each functional fragment, each social (sub)system develops its own laws (»autopoiesis,« cf. Luhmann 1984: 60–64 etc.), which on the one hand guarantees performance in relation to its own function. On the other hand, however, it also leads to isolation from other systems and actors[34], which makes it difficult to anticipate the delayed consequences of one’s own actions.[35]
Modern societies offer their members psychologically effective compensations for the rejection of reflecting on consequences, such as pseudo-interaction with television actors or computer games. These outlets reduce the pressure caused by frustrated needs of interaction, but weaken problem-regulating social forces.
Highly complex social structures are characterized by a notorious lack of reflexivity regarding consequences[36], which makes it difficult for professions such as politics, education, and journalism to make the far-reaching effects of many people’s actions on climate, nature, or the political system so transparent that the majority can orient their actions toward their own desired goals (cf. Pöttker 1997: 124–191, 303–315).
The real dilemma is that the journalistic profession has the task of compensating for the negative effects of the complex social structure under which it itself operates (cf. Pöttker 2000, 2008b). When dealing with right-wing extremism, this must not mean slowing down on the fearless and factual reporting on the concrete consequences for society and each of its members when placing power in the hands of a party such as the AfD through individual voting decisions.
About the author
Horst Pöttker, born in 1944, is a retired Professor of the Theory and Practice of Journalism at TU Dortmund. He is a lecturer at TU Hamburg and at the Faculty of Architecture and Civil Engineering at TU Dortmund University. He is one of the editors of Journalism Research. Contact: horst.poettker@tu-dortmund.de
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Footnotes
1 Welcker and other liberals had succeeded in temporarily securing the enactment of a liberal press law through their efforts in the Grand Duchy of Baden. However, it was only applied from March 1, 1832 to July 5 of the same year, when the German Federal Assembly decided »that the Press Act that had come into effect in the Grand Duchy of Baden on March 1, 1832 ([ …]) was incompatible with existing federal legislation on the press and therefore could not remain in force« (quoted in Welcker 1981: XIII). For demands for freedom of the press and their justifications even before that, see Wilke 1987: 93–98.
2 The realistic reference to the de facto immaturity of the public can be countered by the argument that this also depends on how consistently journalists adhere to their basic professional standards. Withholding information tends to reinforce immaturity, while fearless and free reporting strengthens the ability to deal intelligently with challenging information.
3 The world is shaped by professions performing their tasks more or less consistently. This applies to journalism as it does to all other professions.
4 Nevertheless, even with regard to this quality, journalism is required to do something that is not arbitrary; a soccer report that only mentions the home team’s goals and not the final score would not only be incomplete, but also incorrect.
5 This does not contradict the fact that Islamist extremism also threatens democracy. For even though Salafism acts as a competitor and opponent of German nationalist right-wing extremism in everyday political life, it shares structural similarities with it, for example in terms of ethnocentrism and rejection of religious freedom, which attack the pluralistic and tolerant core of democratic culture in the same way.
6 See the following: Mediendienst Integration 2025.
7 In other European countries, right-wing populist or right-wing extremist parties are even more successful; in some, such as Hungary, Italy, and Slovakia, they lead the government.
8 The AfD made the expatriation of German citizens part of its election platform in January 2025, when its chairwoman Alice Weidel trumpeted the term »remigration« at the party conference with an audible undertone of deportation.
9 For example, the Thuringian AfD leader Björn Höcke provocatively repeated the SA slogan »Everything for Germany!« in public, the propagandistic use of which is prohibited by law, as is the denial of the Holocaust, and then naively claimed ignorance in the criminal proceedings that followed; he was convicted of this by the Federal Court of Justice. (See DTS News Agency 2025).
10 The extent to which right-wing populist and right-wing extremist statements, especially in digital networks, can be legally curbed by these barriers – legal regulations, personal honor, but also the protection of minors – is a question that has not yet been answered clearly enough in comparison to its significance for democracy; The elastic and ambiguous concept of illegal »defamatory criticism« to protect the »right to personal honor« seems too vague for this purpose.
11 This is also related to the fact that the West German population had to face up to the crimes against humanity committed by the Nazi regime as part of its own past in a lengthy process of coming to terms with the past, and therefore remembers it more intensely. Politically, this is evident, for example, in a phenomenon such as the »firewall« against the AfD, which does not exist in other countries. The Austrian population has long exculpated itself as the »first victim,« in France people only knew the Resistance and not collaboration, in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) Auschwitz and the Second World War were blamed on capitalism, and the GDR did not even assume the legal succession of the »Third Reich.«
12 Shouldn’t such bans be decided exclusively on the basis of the goals, programs, and internal structures of parties, regardless of the strength of their electorate?
13 The Janus-faced nature of the AfD was illustrated by an observation made by the author during the 2024 state election campaign in the state of Hesse: Next to a party stand where elderly gentlemen in suits and ties were distributing the official program, a citizen had set up a sign displaying anti-constitutional and Nazi-affiliated quotes from AfD politicians. The »Verfassungsblog« (Constitutional Blog) of renowned lawyers (https://verfassungsblog.de/stellungnahme-parteiverbotsverfahren-afd/, 9/27/2025) lists 115 such quotes, from Alice Weidel’s »Lower the barriers for dual-citizenship criminals: Revoke German citizenship and deport them!« to Alexander Gauland’s »That’s what a German-Turkish woman says. Invite her to Eichsfeld and then tell her what specifically German culture is. After that, she’ll never come back here, and we’ll be able to dispose of her in Anatolia, thank God.« and René Springer’s »We will repatriate foreigners to their home countries. Millions of them. This is not a secret plan. It is a promise.« to Maximilian Krah’s »Because some conservatives now defend feminism, I would like to point out that the current ›intersectional‹ feminism of the third wave is, of course, ›queer‹ – that is, explicitly directed against biologically determined femininity. This is social cancer!«
14 For the controversial discussion about the invitation of AfD politicians to Miosga’s talk show, see Schultz 2024.
15 The nationalist core of the AfD’s manifesto can only be found further down under the heading »More children instead of mass immigration.« There, the demographic birth deficit of around 300,000 to 400,000 per year, which has been continuing for half a century, is linked to »around 100,000 abortions per year.« (AfD 2016: 41)
16 The apparent credibility of such statements is enhanced by the fact that the party initially only gathered around economics professors who considered the euro to be detrimental to European cohesion. The gradual shift towards right-wing extremism, which led to the departure of several founders, took place long below the threshold of public perception.
17 The fact that the personalization of politics is problematic for democracy has long been discussed in political science and journalism. See Imhof/Schulz 1998: 193-356.
18 After all, they aim to ensure that information is accurate and thus preserve the fundamental journalistic quality of accuracy. However, it is not certain whether they can do much to protect democracy from right-wing extremism, given the difficulty of refuting political claims in live interviews and the general decline in the cultural significance of evidence.
19 Another convincing angle is that the traditional focus of political journalism on mutual criticism between parties and »the media’s tendency to predominantly address problems and conflicts and to portray established parties and institutions in a negative light« (Maurer 2019: 139) contributes to an image of politics that makes extremist hostility toward the elites of the democratic system, including its media, appear credible; cf. Pöttker 1985.
20 Another factor might be that journalists who do not overlook this danger expose themselves to a threat from the AfD; cf. the article by Michael Krell et al. in this issue.
21 Instead of being portrayed as a problem, migration should be presented as a welcome opportunity to counteract demographic decline and aging, as well as the resulting problems such as labor shortages and pension insecurity.
22 Smart observers see a sense of belonging and a willingness to fight as basic human needs that right-wing extremism can exploit because left-liberal politics offers little in the way of satisfying them; see Sichtermann/Brückner 2025.
23 The free expression of opinions in the argumentative genre of commentary is part of journalism’s public service mission because it makes transparent the spectrum of subjective views that are possible and exist in a pluralistic social structure within the framework of freedom of expression and freedom of the press and their limitations. In the case of editorials, it can also shed light on the preferences of the media outlet in question when selecting which information to publish and which not to publish.
24 The same applies to other aspects of environmental change such as plastic pollution, the extinction of species, or groundwater depletion.
25 What is the proportion of migrants in the staff of hospitals or construction companies? How many refugees work in waste disposal, but also in the German digital economy or science? How can the birth deficit of around 300,000 per year be offset in view of the already noticeable labor shortage that is driving economic stagnation?
26 This problem is exacerbated by the fact that the AfD hides its true core behind a facade of political normality that is not easy to penetrate.
27 The Nazi Editors’ Law of October 4, 1933 refers to the journalistic »task of exerting intellectual influence on the public,« which should include the duty to »keep everything out of the newspapers: […] that is likely to weaken the power of the German Reich externally or internally, the community spirit of the German people, German defense capabilities, culture, or economy.«
28 »Based on extensive experience with the workers’ press, Lenin gave the classic definition of the functions of socialist journalism: ›The newspaper is not only a collective propagandist and collective agitator, but also a collective organizer.‹ (Works, Vol. 5: 11)« (Dictionary of Socialist Journalism 1984: 70); cf. critically Poerschke 2020.
29 There we read: »Our Opinion journalism helps our audience understand the forces shaping the world. Through columns, guest essays, documentaries, podcasts, and more, our Opinion work convenes conversations and showcases sharp arguments that stimulate and challenge the public conversation. Times Opinion operates independently from the newsroom, but maintains the rigorous standards of all of our journalism.« (Emphasis added by H.P.)
30 This is illustrated, for example, by a rule of professional ethics such as Section 12.1 of the German Press Code: »When reporting on criminal offenses, care must be taken to ensure that mentioning the suspects’ or perpetrators’ affiliation with ethnic, religious, or other minorities does not lead to discriminatory generalizations about individual misconduct. As a rule, membership should not be mentioned unless there is a justified public interest. Particular attention should be paid to the fact that such mention could fuel prejudice against minorities.« This reflects the intention to protect the public from information that is considered harmful and fuels prejudice, even if it is true; in similar journalistic codes in other countries, this rule does not exist at all (Austria) or has a different burden of proof (Switzerland); see the discussion on this in Herczeg/Pöttker 2018.
31 This focus is so deeply rooted in the culture that it is already reflected in the concept of political communication, in which the analysis of political journalism is embedded in communication science: »Political actors are those who […] are involved in bringing about or enforcing decisions with binding effect on the distribution of power or resources […]. Typical political actors are parties, parliaments, governments, states, supranational organizations, and their respective members or representatives. […] It can therefore be said that political communication is communication that is carried out by political actors […] or that relates to political actors and their activities.« (Schulz 2011: 16.) Voters or demonstrators as political actors and thus objects of political reporting are then mentioned »as a matter of course,« but only in a subordinate manner.
32 Empirical research on the relationship between public relations and journalism showed decades ago that press releases from parties and associations are predominantly reproduced by journalistic media with little or no modification; cf. Baerns 1985.
33 A cultural studies-inspired approach to journalism may contribute to a long-term solution to this problem if it draws attention to social processes as subjects of reporting that should be taken more seriously and given greater importance than established institutions and structures. See Trappe 1973, 1974; Pöttker 2004a; Lünenborg 2005.
34 »Self-referential systems are closed systems at the level of this self-referential organization, because they do not allow other forms of processing in their self-determination.« (Luhmann 1984: 60)
35 This is not contradicted by Luhmann’s addition: »The concept of a self-referential closed system does not contradict the system’s openness to the environment: the closed nature of self-referential operation is rather a form of expansion of possible environmental contact; by constituting more determinable elements, it increases the complexity of the environment possible for the system.« (Luhmann 1984: 63) This is because as environmental complexity increases, so does the opacity of the consequences of actions.
36 And with it, the need for regulatory understanding of others, respect, and social integration. From an action theory perspective, social cohesion requires a balance between self-interest and understanding of the subjective meaning that actors attach to their behavior. For the relationship between journalism and politics, see Pöttker 2003, 2004b.
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Citation
Horst Pöttker: Freedom of the press and right-wing extremism. A dilemma? Theses on how journalists should deal with the AfD. In: Journalism Research, Vol. 8 (3-4), 2025, pp. 317-337. DOI: 10.1453/2569-152X-3-42025-15599-en
ISSN
2569-152X
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1453/2569-152X-3-42025-15599-en
First published online
December 2025