By Tanjev Schultz
Abstract: TV debates like the presidential debates in the United States are prominent events in election campaigns. Their rules and effects have been the subject of public and academic discussions for decades. Against this background, this article presents observations and lessons learned from the most recent TV debates in Germany and the United States. It suggests new formats and structures for such programs and uses examples to highlight the dangers that political populism and extremism pose to the seriousness and substance of TV debates.
Keywords: TV duels, presidential debates, personalization, fact checks, election campaigns
In the United States, presidential debates on television have been established in election campaigns for a long time (cf. Schroeder 2016). In Germany, TV ›duels‹[1] between two candidates have existed in this form at the federal level since 2002, when Gerhard Schröder (SPD) and Edmund Stoiber (CSU) competed against each other to become chancellor (cf. Maurer/Reinemann 2003). The format is also commonplace before elections in German states and US states, and in the United States in the pre-selection of candidates (primary debates). TV duels now also take place outside of election campaigns: For example, Welt TV, a channel owned by the German media company Axel Springer, staged an encounter between Alice Weidel (AfD) and Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW) on October 9, 2024.[2] This debate was broadcast after state elections in three federal states, in which the parties of the two politicians had each performed successfully, and several months before the next (regular) federal election. The duel was widely reported not only on Welt TV, but also in the eponymous newspaper Welt and other media.
TV debates can attract widespread attention, which makes them attractive not only for politicians but for news media as well. According to Nielsen (2024), more than 67 million people in the United States watched the 2024 presidential debate between Kamala Harris and Donald Trump on the ABC TV channel. The reach was even higher in 2016 for the debate between Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton. At that time, there were reportedly 84 million viewers (Kennedy 2016). And those who do not watch the show live will in many cases still catch content and snippets from the debate afterwards – on social media (see Arman/McClurg 2024), in legacy news media or in private communications.
This is also one of the attractions of the format in terms of democratic theory: In a confusing, rather fragmented media world, TV debates become a point of reference across all parties; they present the central figures, messages and controversies of an election campaign (see Benoit 2014). They can therefore influence the further course of campaigns and possibly even the outcome of elections (see Maier/Faas 2019 for an overview).
In recent decades, many studies have been published that have examined various aspects of TV debates, particularly often the question of the effects on audiences and the election results. Criticism can be heard time and again in both public and academic discussions. The format is accused of contributing to a superficial portrayal of politics and of pressing it into a simple win-loss scheme. There is also criticism of the moderators’ performance: That they only act as »cue givers« (Tenscher 1998: 154), do not probe enough or neglect relevant topics (cf. Schultz 2006 215ff.; Maier/Faas 2019: 54ff.).
It is not possible in this article to present the numerous findings in detail. With a focus on the most recent TV debates in the United States and in Germany, current observations and lessons learned are presented in five theses. They are intended to stimulate a discussion about the future of TV debates in election campaigns.
1 TV debates can be powerful and efficacious
Researchers have been investigating the effects of TV debates and whether they are decisive for elections ever since these formats have come into existence. The answer to this question must be nuanced. As the extensive research from the US and Germany shows, the effects are »highly contingent and complex« (Maier/Faas 2019: 13). Among other things, they depend on the audience’s prior knowledge, attitudes and political identifications, as well as the process of the debates and the historical constellation (cf. McKinney/Warner 2013). The effects can be greater in some subgroups of the audience than in others. Effects can affect not only voting behavior, but also emotions, gains (or losses) in knowledge and shifts in attitudes (cf. Maier/Faas 2019: 87ff.). TV debates can change people’s perceptions of the candidates – and may indeed influence the outcome of an election (cf. Maurer/Reinemann 2003: 219ff.).
TV debates are just one element in a larger arrangement of political communication. However, as they attract a lot of attention and generate a great deal of follow-up communication, they are very prominent events. An election campaign is played out in »miniature form« in such broadcast programs (Faas/Maier 2004: 56; Maier/Faas 2011). As if under a »burning glass« (Schoen 2004: 29), TV debates can bundle central lines of election campaign communication.
In particular, citizens who are still undecided about who they want to vote for can be influenced by such programs (cf. Maier 2024; McKinney/Warner 2013). If the gap between two candidates is narrow, TV debates can change the situation decisively. Evaluations show that the outcome of a TV debate often benefits the incumbents less (Maier/Faas 2019: 102). In the debate between Harris and Trump, the impression was widespread (especially in media) that Trump had clearly lost. However, the upswing for Harris was not as strong as could have been expected in view of this verdict – and weakened further over the following weeks. This may have to do with the fact that although Harris obviously had a better chance of winning than Joe Biden, as a Vice President she was perceived as an incumbent.
Even in cases when no direct effect on the outcome of the election can be identified, a wide range of consequences are possible that are difficult to measure. As the debates reverberate and excerpts or topics from them appear on social media, effects cannot be limited to the immediate broadcast. What happens then is linked to other events and impressions of the election campaign. And even if nothing changes in the voting intentions of the population, this is an important result, too. Because it means that, on the one hand, the candidates have succeeded in retaining their base and, on the other hand, they have not managed to convince more people to vote for them. They have not made a big mistake, but that is all they have achieved. From a political perspective, it makes sense to attribute great importance and a potentially decisive effect to the debates.
This significance becomes even more feasible when effects are considered that do not solely or directly affect the election result. Debates can change the agenda and bring certain topics and positions to the fore while pushing others into the background. A new dynamic forces the campaign staff to react in ways that harbor new opportunities and risks. Thus, TV debates are a node in a network of events and decisions that cannot necessarily be understood as a simple chain of causes and effects.
Defining moments and slip-ups in a TV debate can have a lasting impact on campaigns, and they can seriously damage the image of a candidate (cf. Maier/Faas 2019: 48f.). This year’s US election campaign has once again demonstrated how powerful TV duels can be: After what was widely perceived a very weak performance in the first presidential debate, Joe Biden had to give up as his party’s candidate and make way for Vice President Kamala Harris – a historic event so close to an election. Of course, such consequences are always embedded in a context. Biden’s state of health had been an issue for some time before the debate raised doubts about his fitness to such an extent that they could no longer be ignored. TV debates can set the course that leads an election campaign in new directions.
2 TV debates are drivers of political personalization
If you are well informed, you won’t learn much from TV debates. Candidates present points from campaign platforms that they have already advocated before and often use the same slogans they have already used elsewhere. This makes sense because the programs on TV reach people who have seen little of the election campaign. Therefore, the standard of journalists expecting something surprising may be unsuitable for determining the value of the debates.
Instead of focusing on the political content for further analysis, media give prominence to other issues that are personal and psychological: How nervous did a candidate appear? How skillfully did someone dodge? What were their facial expressions? Why did a candidate laugh at one point? And overall: Who won the ›duel‹?
This question is in line with a horse-race reporting style, which is as typical of election campaigns as it is problematic in terms of democratic theory (cf. Cappella/Jamieson 1997). The political competition is reported on like a horse race, the discussion of political content is neglected. Even for viewers who are new to the issues presented in the debate, the personalized competition staged by broadcasters could overshadow the content.
As analyses show, candidates in TV debates do talk about factual issues for a considerable part of their speaking time (Maier/Faas 2019: 41f.; Benoit 2014). However, the format focuses the spotlight on people whose characteristics are generally easier to grasp than complex policies (Maier/Faas 2019: 90). Is a candidate likeable, does a politician come across as problem-oriented? Such questions come to the fore (cf. Maurer/Reinemann 2003: 220). In addition, moderators tend to focus on strategy, party tactics and personal aspects (cf. Jansen 2018; Maier/Faas 2019: 44, 54ff.). These aspects are often also at the center of further reporting on TV debates. Journalists evaluate the candidates’ performances like »judges« in sports (Maurer/Reinemann 2003: 228). The question of who won or lost is not geared toward evaluating campaign programs and weighing them up against each other; it focuses on individuals and their talent to sell policies.
In detail, the empirical evidence on the personalization of political communication may be ambiguous (cf. Maier/Faas 2019: 109). Yet, in TV debates, the format itself is an expression of personalization, which can be reflected in the recruitment of political personnel. Anyone running as a candidate for chancellor in Germany also expects to take part in a TV debate.
Certainly, there are uncertainties, ambivalences and opposing tendencies in the phenomenon of personalization (cf. Brettschneider 2002). In Germany, politicians such as Angela Merkel or Olaf Scholz have been successful in recent years, even though they appear rather awkward as individuals and do not fulfill expectations of smooth communication. In the United States, on the other hand, both Harris and Trump, albeit in completely different ways, have been well marketed in the media in terms of their persona and communication style.
In Germany, the multi-party system stands in the way of concentrating on two people. It is true that such a concentration has taken place in the past, for example between Merkel and Schröder or between Schröder and Stoiber. In the 2021 Bundestag election campaign, however, instead of TV duels, there were so-called trialogues in which three people took part: in addition to Olaf Scholz (SPD) and Armin Laschet (CDU), Annalena Baerbock as the lead candidate for the Green Party (cf. Waldvogel et al. 2022; Maier 2024).
In Germany, the once large mainstream parties CDU/CSU and SPD have become smaller in recent years. Formerly smaller parties such as the Greens or now the BSW or AfD, on the other hand, have become so popular, at least temporarily, that they are also laying claim to leadership and putting forward candidates for chancellor. They are obviously hoping for even greater (media) attention from this. It is therefore currently expected that there will once again be no TV duel with just two people in the 2025 federal election campaign. The group is likely to be larger. This would bring the format in Germany closer to the times of the so called ›round of heavy-weights‹, which brought together top politicians from several parties in an election campaign TV program in the years before the introduction of TV duels (cf. Klein 1990; Maurer/Reinemann 2003: 224f.).
On the one hand, this limits personalization, insofar as this concept is understood as focusing on just a few (or two) people in an election campaign. On the other hand, the development described contributes to the fact that the leading figures are now becoming more important in all parties. In the case of the Greens, this can be seen in the importance that has been attached to Robert Habeck’s (presumed) candidacy for chancellor (although current polls give him no reason to make any claims to the chancellorship). In the BSW, the Sahra Wagenknecht alliance, the trend can be seen in the fact that even the party’s name identifies a person as a figurehead.
As Welt TV demonstrated in October 2024, media can also host individual duels in addition to larger debates. In its advertising and journalistic coverage of the duel, the private broadcaster strongly personalized and tabloidized the event; Boris Rosenkranz described it on the media-critical portal Übermedien as follows: »It was all a big blabber jabber. ›She, blonde, 45 years old, is looking for a possible coalition partner for a common future‹, the voiceover creaked in an announcement film about Weidel, only to switch to Wagenknecht: ›Could she be the one who would be interested in a ›romance‹? Black hair, 55, with, let’s say: political left-right weakness‹. […] All the heartfelt vocabulary in the thin cloak of supposedly serious political reporting. In case anyone is wondering how to romanticize populism, normalize it, it works quite well with this kind of talk.« (Rosenkranz 2024)
The much-discussed question in Germany as to whether election campaigns are becoming more American can easily be answered with a »yes« (cf. Tapper/Quandt 2003: 244; Schroeder 2016: 339ff.). Nevertheless, important differences remain that can be explained by a different political and media system – and by a different political culture that defines the personal space. In the US, it is more common than in Germany for candidates to talk about their biographies and families and include them in the election campaign (and it is therefore conspicuous and a media topic if, for example, a wife is often absent, as in the case of Melania Trump). In addition, politicians in the US talk about their religion more frequently than in Germany. What is similar in both countries, however, is the focus on character and external traits and peculiarities, right down to the details of communication. Every hand movement, every facial expression is dissected, no pause in speech, no slip of the tongue goes unnoticed.
The follow-up debates on TV and the comments, memes and videos that circulate on social media during and after TV debates draw attention to the rhetorical and staging skills of the candidates. American news channels, which have to fill their programs around the clock, create a seemingly endless series of talking heads. In this »punditocracy« (Alterman 1992) of communication about communication, various forces try to gain control over the interpretation of TV debates – a struggle that can tire or confuse viewers and is rarely really illuminating. Broadcasters in Germany have taken a similar direction in recent years. But news and documentary channels such as n-tv, Welt TV or Phoenix have not yet achieved the same significance as their major counterparts in the USA (CNN, MSNBC, Fox News, Newsmax), which also have a stronger reputation for being close to one political camp than in Germany.
3 TV debates turn into slingshots of lies
Populism and extremism exacerbate the problems that already arise in TV debates with more moderate politicians. Also they can shorten or falsify facts, whether out of calculation, ignorance or due to the vagueness of a live conversation. The effects can be serious: In their empirical analysis of the TV debates between Stoiber and Schröder, Maurer and Reinemann concluded that the viewers’ knowledge of the labor market did not improve, but worsened, »because they followed Schröder’s abbreviated and in part obviously misleading presentations« (Maurer/Reinemann 2003: 225).
In the present day, fact-check editors can barely keep up with the many misrepresentations and lies of politicians like Donald Trump. The presidential debate with Kamala Harris was teeming with allegations that had to be set straight or refuted (CNN 2024; NPR 2024). Trump attracted particular attention when he focused on the city of Springfield in Ohio, claiming that immigrants from Haiti were eating their neighbors’ pets. Trump was referring to rumors that had not yet made it into the national conversation. This changed abruptly with his contribution. David Muir, who moderated the duel on ABC, directly contradicted the account and emphasized that there was no reliable evidence for it. Kamala Harris wisely did not address the situation in Springfield and left it to her body language to signal that she thought Trump’s comments were nonsense. But the racist rumor had now arrived on the national stage. It stayed there for weeks. According to a YouGov poll after the debate, around a quarter of the US population thought the story was true or probably true (Newsweek 2024). The people of Springfield faced hostility and a media onslaught, with even Ohio Republican Governor Mike DeWine feeling compelled to defend the city and the people of Haiti in a New York Times op-ed (DeWine 2024) – further evidence of how powerful TV debates can be.
Fact checks are a possible correction, but they can only prevent the spread of false information to a limited extent. To a certain extent, they even contribute to it themselves because they repeat the false statements in order to refute them. It is therefore one of the principles of responsible handling of disinformation that not every absurdity and every lie should be taken up, considered and corrected as long as it has not yet crossed a certain threshold of popularity and influence. Serious media cannot respond to every piece of nonsense that is circulating somewhere. However, when it comes to a candidate for the office of US president, they have little choice – and certainly no chance when the candidate is speaking live in front of an audience of millions. That is how TV debates turn into slingshots of lies.
For years, Trump and his fans have been repeating the legend of the stolen election in 2020, right through to this year’s TV debates. In the vice-presidential debate Trump’s running mate J. D. Vance evaded a question about this in a telling way. As if from a textbook on populism, he turned the tables and accused the Democratic Party of having protested the results in previous elections – a misleading account, as the New York Times fact check shows, because the Democratic politicians nevertheless acknowledged their defeats (NYT 2024).
Such rhetorical maneuvers can often be observed among populist and extremist actors: Accusations are ignored or immediately turned around to accuse the other side. For example, when asked by the Welt TV presenter to comment on the extremism of the German party AfD, Alice Weidel was allowed to claim, mostly unchallenged, that her party was not extremist at all and that the current German federal government was in fact extremist. It can be interpreted as a media failure that in interviews, talk shows and in this TV debate, the AfD leadership is repeatedly given the opportunity to whitewash its agenda. The evidence for the extremism of large parts of the AfD has long been documented, so it is pointless to ask Weidel about it in such a way (cf. Schultz 2024).
In the TV debate, the AfD leader also managed to accuse former Chancellor Angela Merkel (CDU) of breaking the German constitution without this being corrected or questioned during the show. With politicians like Weidel, presenters quickly reach their limits, and with Trump it is almost impossible to put a stop to his babbling and wild assertions. In principle, no sentence should be allowed to stand without critical analysis. But wouldn’t that be censorship? Anyone who asks this question misunderstands the role of journalism. Anyone who, based on the idea of an enlightened debate, wants to listen to Trump without interruption can attend his rallies. A journalistic interview or a TV debate should do more.
Ultimately, viewers will have to form their own opinions. Even if many should be able to do so without falling for lies and questionable rhetorical maneuvers: Wouldn’t it be the job of media to make it easier for people to form their own opinions? Isn’t it their job to shine the spotlight on the important issues and problems of society and their possible solutions? But when both citizens and editorial teams are required to put in an immense amount of effort to see through tricks, expose lies, enter and leave political sideshows, there are fewer and fewer resources left for the necessary substantive debates.
Even if a politician like Trump were to engage in factual discussions in a TV debate, this would still be highly problematic as long as he continues to spread extreme content, lies and distortions in other settings and on other platforms. Because these would have to be addressed in a TV debate, otherwise the consequence would be a false impression of the candidate’s seriousness and integrity. After the debate between J. D. Vance and Tim Walz, many media outlets praised the comparatively civil manner in which the two candidates treated each other. However, if you listened closely, you could recognize some dog whistling, especially from J. D. Vance (see NYT 2024; Klein 2024).
In short, populist and extremist politicians are almost impossible to counter in TV debates. They dominate and instrumentalize events. Nevertheless, at least Kamala Harris was quite effective in her encounter with Donald Trump in that she barely responded to outlandish remarks, repeatedly went on the offensive herself and clearly irritated Trump. However, this relative success, which meant that even Republicans and a conservative broadcaster such as Fox News had difficulty proclaiming Trump the winner of the debate, made little impression on die-hard Trump fans.
In many situations, moderators are unable to intervene directly and contradict misrepresentations. If they do, they run the risk of appearing stubborn or one-sided. It is therefore questionable whether TV debates can still be a format for democratic debate and enlightenment in times of populism and extremism. If they cannot, broadcasters would have to do without them or change the format so that the prospects for a substantive debate can improve.
4 TV debates are still immature in journalistic terms
It is hardly surprising that journalists often appear helpless or powerless when dealing with populism and extremism. Other institutions find it difficult to counter populist and extremist strategies, too. But regardless of this difficulty, TV debates still appear to be immature in journalistic terms, despite decades of experience.
It is noticeable that broadcasters do not play to the strengths of the format, which may be due to the fact that these strengths partly cancel each other out: On the one hand, there is the moderation, which can help to guide and contain the politicians’ strategic communication in such a way that, firstly, the discussions do not get out of hand and, secondly, they achieve a minimum level of sincerity and argumentative commitment. On the other hand, there is the appeal of a direct confrontation between the candidates, who are forced to address each other and respond to each other relatively spontaneously.
If on the one hand TV debates are conducted rigidly, this can slow down the potentially enlightening direct exchange (see Tapper/Quandt 2003). If, on the other hand, they are moderated cautiously or not at all, it can happen that the dispute escalates, or one side unfairly takes over the conversation. The solution that is typically sought for such programs amounts to a balance between these tendencies, which in turn can lead to neither one or the other strength coming to the fore at all. Instead, journalists prevent spontaneous references and a genuine exchange of blows, without succeeding in raising the level of argumentation and civility to any significant degree and ensuring that relevant topics and issues are dealt with in sufficient depth. Individual points are dealt with quickly and end just when the discussion should really get going. The moderation usually seems rushed and driven by the desire to tick off a list of topics that is obviously too long. As a result, much remains superficial and the candidates get away with prepared slogans, a few (often misleading) facts and dry explanations.
It would be worth trying out other formats, for example a combination of in-depth individual interviews before and/or after, and a freer dialog between two or three politicians, who would then be more responsible for steering the discussion and involving the others. It could be explained to the audience beforehand in the presence of the candidates what the expectations are, for example, that no one should take the floor permanently and that it would be desirable to respond to the arguments of the others. It is unlikely that in such a setting, in which the moderator deliberately holds back and only intervenes if things escalate, politicians will massively violate the rules of a good discussion as long as these rules are explicitly addressed beforehand and afterwards. After all, the politcians would look bad if they grossly misused the largely unmoderated discussion for themselves and their own purposes.
It could also be a worthwhile experiment not to limit a debate in terms of time (or not to limit it as much). The German weekly newspaper Die Zeit has developed a successful podcast format called »Everything said?« (»Alles gesagt?«). It features interviews with celebrities, sometimes from the world of politics, who can decide for themselves when to stop and end the podcast. The individual podcast episodes sometimes last several hours. What seems like a capitulation to the torrent of professional speakers often works surprisingly well and can be very exciting. Because these conversations can finally do what other formats fail to do: find nuances, clarify pre-understandings, fill terms and phrases with meaning and make it clear how persons think and what drives them, beyond ready-made standard answers.
The format ideas proposed here, which would need to be worked out in more detail, could also fail due to political populism and extremism. Nevertheless, it is worth trying out new approaches – preferably initially with politicians who can be expected to seriously engage with them.
5 TV debates need an accompanying scientific panel
The importance of TV debates before elections is so great that it would make sense not to leave their rules and follow-ups, such as fact checking, to the individual media companies and parties. Even after the first German TV duels for the federal election between Stoiber and Schröder, academics who analyzed them called for an independent organization because such a program »should not be left to the arbitrariness of individual interest groups« (Maurer/Reinemann 2003: 223f.).
In the US, a tradition of having TV debates organized by a non-partisan commission already exists (Schroeder 2016). Since recently, however, this model no longer plays a role (CPD 2024). Donald Trump, Joe Biden and Kamala Harris negotiated with broadcast stations directly, determining the course of the debates without the commission (cf. Cooper 2024). It would be desirable to return to the commission or another independent body, which would then also determine, among other things, how many TV debates there are, when and where (in the 2024 US election campaign, the number of debates was fiercely debated between the parties).
Certainly, there will always be people who accuse even the most cleverly set up organization of acting unfairly and biased. But for many citizens, it could strengthen the legitimacy of and trust in TV debates. The tasks of such an organization need not be limited to setting the rules for TV debates. It could set up a scientific panel to evaluate the debates according to transparent criteria and create fact checks beyond individual editorial offices. It would be naïve to assume that such a panel would not be questioned and attacked. Hence, it would be all the more important for it to be diverse and credible in its composition of scientists and journalists. Just as major scientific organizations in the US and Germany or bodies such as Ethics Councils or National Academies of Science, still manage to uphold the standards of science, such a panel would have to be methodologically rigorous and aware of its limitations. It should not presume to decide normative questions that are political or related to values. However, populist or extremist voices should not be normalized. The tasks for such a non-partisan panel would be to comment on factual claims and to contextualize political positions, as serious fact-checks already attempt to do today.
Despite an erosion of trust in many institutions and the uncertainty caused by disinformation, large sections of the population still have confidence in the work of universities and research institutes. There are also other organizations that enjoy a remarkably high level of trust and are recognized as authorities in their field. In Germany, this applies to »Stiftung Warentest«[3] (cf. infratest dimap 2023: 13), which serves consumer protection and tests products ranging from food to household appliances. At this foundation, journalists work together with scientists and testing institutes. Such a model could be a blueprint or at least an inspiration for the construction of the organization proposed here.
There are other models for the establishment of an independent body that would have a positive effect on good (better) journalism and could be considered as an organizer and supporter of TV debates: A proposal has been made from within journalism research to establish a funding organization for journalism that is based on the structures and rules of the German Research Foundation (DFG) and its peer-review system (cf. Latos et al. 2024). Such an organization could be used not only to promote journalistic concepts and to approve special research projects, but also for fact checks, for the organization of TV debates – and perhaps even for a kind of media inspection service that checks the quality of journalistic content according to transparent criteria (in the sense of minimum standards in the editorial structure and the quality of reporting).
In the US, the Commission on Presidential Debates (CPD), whose future is currently uncertain after it was bypassed by Biden, Harris and Trump (cf. Cooper 2024), could be revived. Or a new model will be found that goes in the direction outlined above. Whichever path is taken, it would be important that results are made available to the public free of charge and that a broad institutional basis is found. In Germany, this could mean that in addition to organizations such as the DFG, other institutions that are above the party dispute are involved in funding and supervision.
Democracy, which is under pressure and in crisis, needs institutional innovations. Anyone who watched the recent TV debates could see and feel that the political communication of the present is hardly up to the major tasks of the future. New, better debate formats would only be a small but important element in revitalizing the public and countering populism and extremism. Society must renew its media infrastructures so that they actually serve democracy.
Translation with help from DeepL
About the author
Tanjev Schultz, Dr. (*1974) has been Professor of Journalism at Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz since 2016. In September 2024, he traveled through the Midwest and South of the USA and was a guest at Wayne State University (Detroit), Indiana University (Bloomington) and the University of Memphis. He is one of the editors of the journal Journalistik / Journalism Research. Contact: tanjev.schultz@uni-mainz.de
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-658-35758-0_24-1
Footnotes
1 »TV duel« is the name used in Germany to refer to television debates between two high-profile candidates in an election campaign.
2 The AfD is a far-right party in Germany, its full name is »Alternative für Deutschland« (Alternative for Germany). The party was founded in 2013. The BSW – »Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht« (Alliance Sahra Wagenknecht) is a party just founded in 2024. Its name giver used to be a famous member of »Die Linke« (The Left).
3 Transparency notice: The author is a member of the Board of Directors of Stiftung Warentest.
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Citation
Tanjev Schultz: TV debates as slingshots of lies. Lessons from German and US election campaigns. In: Journalism Research, Vol. 7 (3/4), 2024, pp. 264-278. DOI: 10.1453/2569-152X-3/42024-14649-en
ISSN
2569-152X
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1453/2569-152X-3/42024-14649-en
First published online
November 2024