By Marcus Bölz
Abstract: Since Finland joined NATO in 2023, Finnish journalism has been operating under new geopolitical conditions. The realignment of security policy has not only changed political reporting, but also increased demands on journalistic diligence and source verification. A particular focus is on Russia’s disinformation policies, which deliberately attempt to undermine trust in Finnish media and institutions. Digital campaigns, manipulated content, and emotional rhetoric are used to influence public opinion. Finnish editorial offices are responding with increased transparency, more rigorous fact-checking, and international cooperation. This article analyses the quality of journalism in Finland in the context of these developments and the structural challenges Finnish journalists are facing, including media concentration, staff cuts, and the rise of right-wing populist platforms.
For decades, Finland has been considered one of the countries with the highest journalistic quality worldwide. The country regularly ranks at the top of international press freedom rankings (cf. Reporters Without Borders, 2023). However, geopolitical developments in recent years – in particular NATO membership in 2023 and a rising threat from Russia – have changed the journalistic landscape. At the same time, digitalisation has profoundly transformed everyday editorial work.
Journalism in Finland faces challenges similar to those in other European countries: media concentration, declining circulation, a decline in the number of permanently employed journalists, and growing support for right-wing populist websites. In Finland, too, there are platforms with high user traffic that distinguish themselves from traditional quality media and serve alternative narratives. The Finnish media landscape is under pressure from economic rationalisation and shifting political priorities. Ala-Fossi et al. (2021) show that despite shrinking editorial offices, professional journalistic standards are being maintained – albeit under increasingly precarious conditions. At the same time, Ala-Fossi et al. (2022) document how media policy decisions have prioritised economic competitiveness over democratic media promotion since the turn of the millennium. Amid this tension, the educational function of journalism is gaining importance: Jaakkola (2020) describes journalists as »media educators« who contribute to the communication of democratic values through inclusive boundary work. Finnish media policy thus stands between market logic and democratic responsibility.
Although Finland continues to be considered one of the countries with the highest level of trust in news media in international comparisons (cf. Reunanen, 2023), recent studies show that the first cracks in this relationship of trust are beginning to show here as well. According to the Reuters Institute’s Digital News Report, 69 percent of respondents still trusted the news as a whole in 2023 and 76 percent trusted the sources they themselves used, but this represents a decline of nine percentage points compared to 2015 (cf. Reuters Institute, 2025). Particularly striking is the growing gap between general trust in news and trust in individually consumed content – indicating incipient media fragmentation and polarisation.
This development corresponds with an increasing politicisation of media trust. A study by public broadcaster Yle shows that supporters of the right-wing populist party The Finns (Perussuomalaiset) in particular have significantly less trust in established media brands such as Yle or the national daily newspaper Helsingin Sanomat (cf. Helenius, 2025).
Linguistic diversity also poses a challenge. Finland is officially bilingual: Finnish and Swedish are considered equally as official languages. While the majority of the total population (around 5.5 million in an area roughly the size of Germany) speaks Finnish, there is a stable infrastructure of Swedish-language media aimed at the approximately 5.2 percent of the population who speak Swedish as their mother tongue (cf. Statistics Finland, 2022). Swedish-language media such as Hufvudstadsbladet, Vasabladet, and Yle Vega are considered professional, editorially independent, and strongly rooted in the region (cf. Nikula, 2012; Lindgren, 2005).
The Sámi communities also have their own media structures. The founding of Yle Sámi Radio in 1990 was a milestone. It regularly broadcasts news in the three Sámi languages spoken in Finland – Northern Sámi, Inari Sámi, and Skolt Sámi (cf. Pietikäinen, 2008). According to Statistics Finland, around 10,700 Sámi live in Finland, which corresponds to approximately 0.2 percent of the total population (cf. Statistics Finland, 2025). The language is divided into three main dialects: Northern Sámi (approx. 60%), Inari Sámi (approx. 20%), and Skolt Sámi (approx. 20%) (cf. Lehtola, 2015). Media use among Sámi varies greatly: While public service offerings such as Yle Sápmi are regularly consumed, studies show that younger Sámi increasingly prefer digital platforms; at the same time, this younger group also is also less attached to traditional journalistic formats (cf. Pietikäinen, 2018; Hætta, 2020).
These media not only constitute an expression of linguistic diversity, but also of democratic added value. They promote media pluralism, strengthen diversity of opinion, and offer perspectives that are often underrepresented in the Finnish-speaking majority public (cf. Huss & Lindgren, 2011; Valkonen, 2019).
Sanna Marin and sexism from Russia
The media coverage and political reception of former Finnish Prime Minister Sanna Marin is paradigmatic of liberal democracies being vulnerable to digital disinformation. The so-called ›party scandal‹ – triggered by leaked videos showing Marin dancing and partying – became the subject of political and media debate not only nationally but also internationally. The focus was less on the content of the videos than on their symbolic significance in the context of geopolitical tensions.
Russia responded to Finland’s accession to NATO with a variety of hybrid measures, including targeted disinformation campaigns. Social media in particular were used to sow doubts about NATO membership in advance. Russian troll factories spread false information about alleged troop movements or economic disadvantages. Particularly striking was the discrediting of Marin – young, a woman, Western, free – who was targeted by a digital attack.
Disinformation researcher Christopher Nehring (2022) emphasises that it is »highly likely« that Russian trolls and bots deliberately fuelled the shitstorm against Marin. Although there is no empirical study that explicitly examines this case in Finland, the patterns correspond to known mechanisms of hybrid influence, as described by the NATO StratCom Centre of Excellence (2021) under the term »cognitive warfare«.
The method is old, the goal new: sexualisation as a weapon. Marin was not attacked for her political decisions, but for her femininity, youth, and zest for life. Legal scholar Luana F. Souto describes this strategy as »gender-specific disinformation« that specifically targets women in politics and is based on the historical assumption that politics is a »man’s business« (Souto, 2023, p. 49). Studies from gender media studies confirm that women politicians are more frequently confronted with morally connoted attacks – especially on social media (cf. Springer Reference Gender Media Studies, 2024).
In Marin’s case, sexually connoted content was used, along with images taken out of context and rumours of drug use, so effectively that Marin felt compelled to take a drug test, which came back negative (cf. Yle News, 2022).
The media scandalisation of Sanna Marin follows a familiar pattern of public discrediting: first, a private moment – in this case, a dance video – is made public, then sexualised and morally charged. The debate itself becomes a weapon aiming to undermine the person’s integrity. Bulkow and Petersen (2012) describe such strategies as »structures for generating public attention« in which performative violations of norms are deliberately staged to provoke outrage. In this context, Christian Schicha (2015) warns against an ethically problematic »scandalisation of the private sphere« that serves not to enlighten but to mobilise emotions. In Marin’s case, the criticism was reinforced by gender-specific attributions, as Williams (2022) analyses: the outrage was fuelled less by rational criticism than by an interplay of sexism and moral expectations of women leaders.
The publication of the dance video in 2022 marked not only a turning point in the public debate about the privacy of political actors, but also the beginning of spiralling digital violence, manifesting in the form of sexualised deepfakes. Within days of the leak, the internet was flooded with pornographic material in which Marin’s face was superimposed onto the bodies of porn actors using AI technology. This form of image-based violence is not only a violation of personal rights, but also an attack on the sexual self-determination and democratic participation of those affected (cf. Schmidt, 2024, pp. 4f.).
As the Federal Agency for Civic Education notes in a comprehensive analysis, such content constitutes »non-consensual sexualising deepfakes,« which have become a widespread internet phenomenon – primarily to the detriment of prominent women (cf. Schmidt, 2024, p. 9).
The manipulated images appear deceptively real and are often uploaded to pornographic platforms, frequently accompanied by derogatory comments and personal data that enable identification (cf. Schmidt, 2024, p. 10). The perpetrators use publicly available photos, for example from social media profiles, and place them in pornographic contexts with the help of face-swap or DeepNude apps. Those affected experience this form of violence as a »physical sexual assault« that causes considerable psychological distress and often leads to withdrawal from public discourse.
In Marin’s case, this technique was used specifically to undermine her political credibility. The sexualised portrayal was not intended for entertainment, but rather for moral discrediting and political delegitimisation. The fact that such content was disseminated on a massive scale demonstrates the structural dimension of this form of violence: it is part of a »continuum of sexualised violence« that systematically reduces women to their sexuality and thereby marginalises them socially (cf. Schmidt, 2024, p. 13).
Particularly insidious about this is the combination of the images’ apparent authenticity with the viral dynamics of social media, enabling rapid and widespread dissemination.
The democratic relevance of this development should not be underestimated. When women politicians are forced out of public discourse by sexualised deepfakes, not only is their individual freedom violated, but the equality of participation in democratic processes is also jeopardised. The targeted production and dissemination of such content is therefore not only an ethical but also a political problem that urgently requires regulatory and social attention.
The Finnish public’s reactions were ambivalent. While conservative voices accused Marin of lacking seriousness, she was celebrated as a symbol of a modern, self-confident democracy in the international media. Surveys showed that Marin was able to maintain her popularity among large sections of the public despite – or perhaps because of – the scandal (cf. DW, 2022; ARD Weltspiegel, 2023).
How are Finnish media outlets responding to these developments?
The responses of Finnish editorial offices to the challenges posed by disinformation, digital transformation, and political polarisation are complex and structurally profound. They affect both journalistic work practices and the organisation and ethical integrity of media companies.
A key example is Yle, Finland’s public broadcaster, founded in 1926. Yle produces content in Finnish, Swedish, and Sami, fulfilling a comprehensive information, education, and cultural mandate. Since 2022, Yle has been legally obliged to limit its online text reporting in order not to become »unfair competition« for commercial media (cf. Reunanen, 2025, p. 86). At the same time, Yle is publicly criticised by representatives of the right-wing populist party The Finns for pursuing a »green-left agenda« – leading to a politically motivated debate about the role of public service media (cf. Ojala, 2021, p. 2049).
The largest daily newspaper Helsingin Sanomat (founded in 1889) and the tabloid Iltalehti (since 1980) are examples of the tension between quality journalism and populist media criticism. While Helsingin Sanomat is expanding its data journalism formats and interactive content, Iltalehti uses algorithms to analyse the emotional impact of headlines to better anticipate reader reactions (cf. Reuters Institute, 2025).
Editorial teams are responding to polarisation with constructive journalism that focuses on de-escalation and contextualisation (cf. Schöppl & Schwarzenegger, 2025). At the same time, fact checks and visual analysis formats are gaining in importance. Cooperation with European fact-checking initiatives such as Faktabaari – a member of the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) – strengthens journalistic resilience to disinformation (cf. Nordicom, 2024).
Structurally, there is a shift towards cross-media teams that plan and jointly produce print, online, and social media content (cf. Salovaara et al., 2021). Traditional departmental journalism is increasingly being replaced by topic pools and project-based forms of work (cf. Heinonen & Ahva, 2015). Editorial offices such as Helsingin Sanomat and Yle have restructured or merged their departments to be able to respond more flexibly to topics and events (cf. Kuutti & Kangas, 2020).
The »Worlds of Journalism study« by Väliverronen et al. (2023) shows that Finnish journalists are under increasing pressure despite their high level of professional identification: economisation, work intensification, and political polarisation are leading to an erosion of traditional professional standards. Media concentration is particularly problematic: according to MediaDB (2024), a few large corporations such as Sanoma and Alma Media control the majority of the print and online market, limiting the diversity of perspectives and jeopardising editorial independence. The Union of Journalists in Finland (2024) also warns of precarious working conditions, especially for freelance journalists, whose income is often below the subsistence level. At the same time, journalistic work is being fragmented by digitalisation: multitasking, time pressure, and algorithmic reach logic are changing editorial routines and are making investigative research more difficult. Nevertheless, trust in journalism remains comparatively high in Finland – a finding that can be attributed to strong journalistic training and ethical standards. Finnish media policy now faces the task of securing democratic media structures without losing sight of economic competitiveness. The future of Finnish journalism depends on whether it succeeds in reconciling editorial quality, diversity, and social security.
Television journalism is also undergoing its own development. In recent decades, Finnish television entertainment has evolved into an independent cultural field that integrates both national characteristics and transnational influences. While the public broadcaster Yleisradio (Yle) and the commercial broadcaster MTV3 are the key players in the production and distribution of entertainment programmes, audience reception is strongly influenced by a tension between local identity and global formats (cf. Hellman, 2010, p. 112). Studies show that Finnish audiences prefer formats that appear »authentic, calm and respectful« (ibid., p. 112).
The number of permanently employed journalists is declining. According to Nordicom (2022), the number of full-time journalists in Finland fell by around 25 percent between 2008 and 2020. Special beats such as science, culture, and foreign affairs have been particularly affected (cf. Ahva et al., 2017, pp. 825ff). This leads to a weakening of thematic depth and diversity, as Väliverronen & Saikkonen (2020) also emphasise.
Technologically, Finnish editorial offices rely on AI-supported tools such as automatic text generation, semantic search engines, and personalised news feeds (cf. Lehtisaari et al., 2023). While these systems increase efficiency, media ethicists warn of an alienation from the basic skills of journalism (cf. Pöyhtäri, 2023). The challenge is to use AI as a tool without undermining journalistic standards.
Journalistic culture in Finland is strongly influenced by ethical standards. A central pillar of journalistic self-regulation in Finland is the Press Council JSN (Julkisen Sanan Neuvosto). Founded in 1968, the JSN acts as an independent body for monitoring journalistic ethics and handling complaints about media content. Institutionally independent, the JSN is supported by the country’s major media organisations, including newspapers, broadcasters, and online media (cf. Ahva et al., 2017; Heinonen & Ahva, 2015).
The JSN is based on a voluntary code of conduct that is recognised by almost all relevant media companies. It examines complaints on the basis of journalistic ethics guidelines, which are regularly updated and regulate, and include, among other principles, transparency, source criticism, protection of privacy, and the separation of opinion and news. The JSN’s decisions are publicly available and serve as guidance for editorial practice (cf. Salovaara et al., 2021).
The JSN is becoming increasingly important, especially in times of growing polarisation and disinformation. It not only provides a forum for debate on media ethics, but also strengthens public confidence in journalistic integrity. Studies show that the existence and visibility of the JSN contributes significantly to the high credibility of Finnish media (cf. Strömbäck et al., 2021, Ahva, 2024).
In practice, this means that editorial offices such as Helsingin Sanomat, Yle, Iltalehti, and Hufvudstadsbladet regularly refer to JSN decisions, for example when correcting errors or justifying editorial decisions. The JSN thus not only functions as a supervisory body, but also as a sounding board for journalistic self-reflection – and as a model for ethical media regulation that has gained international recognition (cf. Hanitzsch et al., 2019).
What can Germany learn from Finland?
An analysis of the Finnish media system thus shows that journalistic resilience does not solely arise from technical innovations or legal frameworks, but from a deeply rooted culture of self-regulation, media education, and ethical reflection. For Germany, several transferable insights can be drawn from this.
Firstly, the role of the JSN press council as a publicly visible, transparent, and widely accepted supervisory body strengthens trust in the media in the long term. In Germany, there is a comparable body, the German Press Council, but its public visibility and social relevance are significantly lower. The Finnish practice of regularly reflecting on JSN decisions in reporting and using them as an ethical frame of reference could also contribute to strengthening journalistic credibility in Germany (cf. Ahva et al., 2017; Heinonen & Ahva, 2015).
Secondly, systematic media education, which in Finland begins at preschool age and is coordinated by the National Audiovisual Institute (KAVI), is a central component of democratic resilience. Programmes such as Uudet lukutaidot show how media literacy, digital skills, and ethical reflection can be integrated into the educational landscape (cf. KAVI, 2023; Pekkala, 2025). In Germany, there is currently no comparable coherent, nationally coordinated strategy for media education.
Thirdly, journalistic practice in Finland is less characterised by alarmism and scandalisation than in Germany. Studies show that Finnish journalists prefer restrained, factual, and dialogue-oriented reporting focusing on resonance rather than polarisation (cf. Strömbäck et al., 2021; Ahva, 2024). This contrasts with parts of the German media landscape, where tabloid formats and political commentary in particular often rely on exaggeration and emotionalisation (cf. Esser & Brüggemann, 2016).
Fourthly, the integration of AI technologies in Finnish newsrooms is subject to clear ethical guidelines. While tools such as ChatGPT or Yle’s own modules contribute to increased efficiency, there is also intense debate about the limits of automated content (cf. Lehtisaari et al., 2023; Pöyhtäri, 2023). The debate on AI and ethics began at around the same time in Germany. In both countries, editorial offices are experimenting and discussing the topic extensively. The question remains for both, Germany and Finland: where is journalism heading against the backdrop of these new possibilities?
Fifthly: Journalistic self-organisation in Finland – for example, through cross-media teams, project-based working methods and data journalism formats – shows how editorial offices can respond flexibly to social challenges without compromising their quality standards (cf. Salovaara et al., 2021; Heinonen & Ahva, 2015).
Overall, it can be said that Finland is meeting the challenges of the (digital) public sphere with structural composure, ethical clarity, and educational foresight. The Finnish model offers valuable inspiration for Germany – not as a blueprint, but as a guide for a journalistic culture that not only expects trust, but actively cultivates it.
About the author
Marcus Bölz, Prof. Dr. phil. Dipl.-Journ. (*1975), has been Professor of Journalism, Sports Journalism, and Media Psychology at Fachhochschule des Mittelstands (Berlin) since 2014. Prior to this, he worked for many years as a journalist for various editorial offices such as the news editorial department of Deutsche Welle, dpa, zeit.de, but also as a sports editor for the Schwäbische Zeitung and as a local editor for the Rhein-Zeitung. He also lives and teaches part-time in Finland and therefore regularly observes Finnish media.
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Citation
Marcus Bölz: Journalism in Finland amid changing geopolitical and digital conditions. How humiliating deepfakes are interfering with political communication. In: Journalism Research, Vol. 9 (1), 2026, pp. 25-36. DOI: 10.1453/2569-152X-12026-15951-en
ISSN
2569-152X
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1453/2569-152X-12026-15951-en
First published online
April 2026